Frances to Cheerskep and others... Your remarks about signing and calling and naming objects from a notional and nominal stance is mainly understood and appreciated, but my agreement extends only to the degree that such subjectivity is held as a special approach to particular issues turning on psychologism, and in no way is posited or construed as a global approach to all signs and minds. Within that limited frame, my reflection on the stance as explicated by you has been rewarding. Having said that piece, your posts have led me to search for more detailed information on any "ontic existence" that current studies in ontology may reveal. My goals of course are to compare this information with the realist ontology of Peircean pragmatism and philosophy, and to assess whether these ontologies might be a useful study, especially in regard to aesthetic and artistic issues, such as the existent reality of created fantasies and invented fictions and imaginary figures and deluded illusions and phantom afflictions. Any comments or suggested sources and books on the field will be most welcome.
Cheerskep partly wrote in effect... I argue that "art" and "artness" is a mythical ontic category or quality, like notions of miracles, destiny, luck, holiness, genius, and more. People sincerely entertain those notions, and when they use those words they sincerely believe they "refer to" or "denote" and "name" a non-mental entity, a "real thing" out there, the way they believe that 'the Plymouth Rock' and 'the Eiffel Tower' are names of real non-mental things. One of the "categories" that I include for comparison to "art" is "sin". Those who say this truly believe there is an ontic category of "sinful" acts. Combined with other mind-independent entities they believe in, like soul and heaven and hell, whether or not a given act IS a 'sin' is of great import. If they are being honest, people who think this way concede certain works ARE "art" and the rest are not, and that's the ontic fact-of-the-matter. I also argue that in all walks of life we are justified in rejecting entire genres without exposing ourselves to every possible instance of them. As examples of genres that I claim we could reasonably dismiss from our lives if we find they consistently occasion boredom or misery is jazz, German lieder, dog shows, golf matches, flower shows, wrestling matches, Kabuki, opera, and prize fights.
