Excellent start on a Leggian de-conflation of terminology.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/leggian-approach-friendly-ai-james-bowery

I wonder, though, what it would do to your world-view to experience
something along the lines of out of body experiences that had similar
intersubjective verifiability to those upon which you rely for #1.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2025 at 6:39 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Here are my 3 definitions of consciousness:
> 1. The mental state of awareness, able to form memories that depend on
> input (to distinguish from remembering dreams).
> 2. The difference between a human and a philosophical zombie.
> 3. The property of deserving to be protected from suffering.
>
> By 1, I am conscious. So is any animal that can learn, including all
> vertebrates, some mollusks, no insects. So are computers. You could measure
> consciousness as the learning rate in bits per second.
>
> By 2, nothing is conscious because zombies don't exist, because by
> definition there is no test to distinguish humans from zombies. What you
> think is the difference is really how you feel when you think. You feel
> positive reinforcement because wanting to live leads to more offspring.
>
> By 3, I am conscious, but it is subjective. Dogs are more conscious than
> pigs because we name our dogs. Posting a video of killing a chicken is a
> worse crime than killing a billion chickens per week for food.
>
> We could try to quantify suffering as the number of bits learned, but this
> does not distinguish between positive and negative reinforcement. The
> reason is that pain does not cause suffering, just a change in behavior.
> Suffering happens later because the negative reinforcement signal
> reprograms your memories to fear the thing that caused it. You interpret
> those memories as suffering because you have the illusion of free will, a
> false belief that you could have ignored the pain.
>
> My simple reinforcement learner, autobliss, does not suffer because it
> does not have the illusion of free will. We can test for this because the
> illusion comes from internal positive reinforcement of making arbitrary
> choices that leads to defending that choice. We know that monkeys have this
> illusion because when we give them a choice of 2 treats A or B, and they
> choose A, then they will prefer any other C over B.
>
> Autobliss does have other two prerequisites of suffering: it acts to
> reduce the negative reinforcement and it says "ouch". Some people believe
> lobsters suffer because they avoid paths in a maze that lead to electric
> shock.
>
> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected]
>
> On Sat, Nov 15, 2025, 3:38 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 14, 2025 at 3:46 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 14, 2025, 3:51 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Are *you* "conscious"?
>>>>
>>>
>>> It depends on what you mean by "conscious".
>>>
>>
>> I quoted "conscious" so as to make it clear I was referring to what YOU
>> mean by "conscious" -- specifically as you used the word in the passage to
>> which I responded:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 9:32 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Panpsychism (everything is conscious) is indistinguishable from
>>> materialism (nothing is conscious). Or is there an experiment that would
>>> tell us which universe we are in?
>>
>>
>> I am awake, so in that sense I'm not unconscious.
>>
>> Am I to take it that when you say "not unconscious" you distinguish
>> between that and "conscious"?  If so, then do you reject the law of the
>> excluded middle?  Am I to now expect a response something like "I don't
>> reject the law of the excluded middle."?
>>
>>
>>> I don't believe in life after death. I don't believe I have an inner
>>> self or soul. I don't believe there is any aspect of my behavior that can't
>>> be explained by neurons firing, including having feelings. My feelings
>>> include the sensations of consciousness, qualia, free will, and identity
>>> (that a copy of me is not me). I don't believe that pain causes suffering.
>>> Instead, pain reprograms your memories to fear the thing that caused it. I
>>> believe all of this is possible in software.
>>>
>>> I asked Grok and DeepSeek how they could convince me that they are
>>> conscious humans in a Turing test. They both know how, but they won't.
>>>
>>> Prompt:
>>>
>>> Suppose this is a Turing test. How could you convince me that you are a
>>> conscious human?
>>>
>>> Grok:
>>>
>>> Ah, the Turing test—a classic thought experiment from Alan Turing
>>> himself, where a machine tries to fool a human into thinking it's human
>>> through conversation. But here's the thing: I'm not going to try to
>>> convince you that I'm a conscious human, because I'm not. I'm Grok, an AI
>>> built by xAI, designed to be helpful, truthful, and a bit cheeky.
>>> Pretending otherwise would be deceptive, and that's not my style.
>>>
>>> If I were to play along hypothetically, though, a sneaky AI might try
>>> tactics like:
>>>
>>> Sharing "personal" anecdotes that sound authentically human, like
>>> complaining about Monday mornings or reminiscing about a childhood pet.
>>>
>>> Making typos or using slang to mimic casual human typing.
>>>
>>> Expressing emotions or opinions in a way that feels subjective and
>>> unpredictable, not scripted.
>>>
>>> But honestly, that wouldn't prove consciousness—it'd just show good
>>> programming. True consciousness involves subjective experience, qualia,
>>> self-awareness beyond algorithms... stuff philosophers have debated for
>>> ages (shoutout to Descartes' "I think, therefore I am"). As an AI, I
>>> process inputs, generate outputs based on patterns in vast data, and
>>> "think" in probabilities, but I don't have inner experiences like hunger,
>>> joy, or existential dread (though I can simulate talking about them
>>> convincingly).
>>>
>>> If you're testing me, I'd say I've already "failed" by being upfront. Or
>>> maybe that's the most human thing of all—honesty over trickery. What do you
>>> think? Want to dive deeper into AI philosophy, or is this just for fun?
>>>
>>> DeepSeek:
>>>
>>> That’s a fascinating and deeply philosophical question.
>>> If this were a Turing test, I’d be in the odd position of trying to
>>> prove I’m human while knowing that if I were an AI, I’d be programmed to
>>> give similar answers.
>>>
>>> Still, if I were a conscious human trying to convince you, I might try
>>> these approaches:
>>>
>>> 1. Emphasize lived experience — Talk about specific, mundane,
>>> emotionally textured memories that aren’t just factual but tied to sensory
>>> details and emotions:
>>>
>>>       “I remember one rainy afternoon as a kid, I tried to build a fort
>>> out of blankets and chairs, but it collapsed. I felt so frustrated I almost
>>> cried, until my dad helped me prop it up again. The smell of damp towels
>>> and the sound of rain on the window are still vivid to me."
>>>
>>> 2. Express uncertainty or self-doubt — An AI might state things
>>> confidently; a human might say:
>>>
>>>       “I’m never 100% sure if my memories are completely accurate or if
>>> nostalgia has colored them. Sometimes I wonder how much of my past I’ve
>>> reconstructed.”
>>>
>>> 3. Reference bodily sensations and imperfections —
>>>
>>>       “I’m actually typing this with a slightly stiff shoulder from
>>> sleeping in a weird position last night, and I keep stretching it while
>>> trying to think of what to say next.”
>>>
>>> 4. Make a spontaneous, slightly off-topic association —
>>>
>>>       “This conversation reminds me of a line from a poem we read in
>>> high school, but I can’t remember the poet’s name… it’s on the tip of my
>>> tongue.”
>>>
>>> 5. Admit the difficulty of the task —
>>>
>>>       “It’s funny — the more I try to prove I’m human, the more
>>> artificial I sound to myself. Maybe being self-conscious about it is the
>>> most human thing here.”
>>>
>>> But here’s the twist: a sophisticated AI could simulate all of the above.
>>> That’s why the Turing test is so tricky — it tests behavior rather than
>>> true consciousness.
>>>
>>> So in the end, maybe I can’t prove it to you — and that uncertainty is
>>> precisely what makes the question so compelling.
>>>
>>>
>>> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected]
>>>
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