I'm not sure you groked the condition I placed on your counterfactual OBEs:
"that had similar intersubjective verifiability to those upon which you rely" By "similar" I don't mean "equal". I mean "similar" as in "similar triangles". While I agree that quantity becomes quality in such judgements, the point is that we're on a continuum that, ultimately, leads us back to ourselves, which is why I asked: Are you "conscious"? On Sun, Nov 16, 2025 at 11:45 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> wrote: > I never had an out of body experience. I think they can be explained as > vivid dreams. I already experience consciousness, which is in strong > conflict with my belief that it is an illusion. I know we can experience > things that aren't real. > > We construct mental models of the world to help us predict sensory input > that is important for survival and reproduction. For a long time we thought > the gods made the sun rise and set, and that was good enough to predict the > sun will rise tomorrow. > > But a proper model of the world would include the thing that includes the > model, which is impossible by Wolpert's law. Reality can never be what we > think it is, no matter how smart we are. > > Quantum mechanics seems strange because it describes a deterministic wave > equation for observers seeing random particles. Relativity seems strange > because it describes observers sensing space and time in a reality where > they don't exist. Both theories are symmetric with respect to time, but > describe asymmetric observers, which are any things that make measurements, > which are irreversible operations because they erase the older stored > values. > > So it should not be hard to understand why we have the illusion of type 2 > consciousness. We can even explain it using classical physics, in a world > made of particles that exist in time and space. > > -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] > > On Sun, Nov 16, 2025, 12:24 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Excellent start on a Leggian de-conflation of terminology. >> >> https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/leggian-approach-friendly-ai-james-bowery >> >> I wonder, though, what it would do to your world-view to experience >> something along the lines of out of body experiences that had similar >> intersubjective verifiability to those upon which you rely for #1. >> >> On Sat, Nov 15, 2025 at 6:39 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Here are my 3 definitions of consciousness: >>> 1. The mental state of awareness, able to form memories that depend on >>> input (to distinguish from remembering dreams). >>> 2. The difference between a human and a philosophical zombie. >>> 3. The property of deserving to be protected from suffering. >>> >>> By 1, I am conscious. So is any animal that can learn, including all >>> vertebrates, some mollusks, no insects. So are computers. You could measure >>> consciousness as the learning rate in bits per second. >>> >>> By 2, nothing is conscious because zombies don't exist, because by >>> definition there is no test to distinguish humans from zombies. What you >>> think is the difference is really how you feel when you think. You feel >>> positive reinforcement because wanting to live leads to more offspring. >>> >>> By 3, I am conscious, but it is subjective. Dogs are more conscious than >>> pigs because we name our dogs. Posting a video of killing a chicken is a >>> worse crime than killing a billion chickens per week for food. >>> >>> We could try to quantify suffering as the number of bits learned, but >>> this does not distinguish between positive and negative reinforcement. The >>> reason is that pain does not cause suffering, just a change in behavior. >>> Suffering happens later because the negative reinforcement signal >>> reprograms your memories to fear the thing that caused it. You interpret >>> those memories as suffering because you have the illusion of free will, a >>> false belief that you could have ignored the pain. >>> >>> My simple reinforcement learner, autobliss, does not suffer because it >>> does not have the illusion of free will. We can test for this because the >>> illusion comes from internal positive reinforcement of making arbitrary >>> choices that leads to defending that choice. We know that monkeys have this >>> illusion because when we give them a choice of 2 treats A or B, and they >>> choose A, then they will prefer any other C over B. >>> >>> Autobliss does have other two prerequisites of suffering: it acts to >>> reduce the negative reinforcement and it says "ouch". Some people believe >>> lobsters suffer because they avoid paths in a maze that lead to electric >>> shock. >>> >>> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >>> >>> On Sat, Nov 15, 2025, 3:38 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Nov 14, 2025 at 3:46 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 14, 2025, 3:51 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Are *you* "conscious"? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It depends on what you mean by "conscious". >>>>> >>>> >>>> I quoted "conscious" so as to make it clear I was referring to what YOU >>>> mean by "conscious" -- specifically as you used the word in the passage to >>>> which I responded: >>>> >>>> On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 9:32 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Panpsychism (everything is conscious) is indistinguishable from >>>>> materialism (nothing is conscious). Or is there an experiment that would >>>>> tell us which universe we are in? >>>> >>>> >>>> I am awake, so in that sense I'm not unconscious. >>>> >>>> Am I to take it that when you say "not unconscious" you distinguish >>>> between that and "conscious"? If so, then do you reject the law of the >>>> excluded middle? Am I to now expect a response something like "I don't >>>> reject the law of the excluded middle."? >>>> >>>> >>>>> I don't believe in life after death. I don't believe I have an inner >>>>> self or soul. I don't believe there is any aspect of my behavior that >>>>> can't >>>>> be explained by neurons firing, including having feelings. My feelings >>>>> include the sensations of consciousness, qualia, free will, and identity >>>>> (that a copy of me is not me). I don't believe that pain causes suffering. >>>>> Instead, pain reprograms your memories to fear the thing that caused it. I >>>>> believe all of this is possible in software. >>>>> >>>>> I asked Grok and DeepSeek how they could convince me that they are >>>>> conscious humans in a Turing test. They both know how, but they won't. >>>>> >>>>> Prompt: >>>>> >>>>> Suppose this is a Turing test. How could you convince me that you are >>>>> a conscious human? >>>>> >>>>> Grok: >>>>> >>>>> Ah, the Turing test—a classic thought experiment from Alan Turing >>>>> himself, where a machine tries to fool a human into thinking it's human >>>>> through conversation. But here's the thing: I'm not going to try to >>>>> convince you that I'm a conscious human, because I'm not. I'm Grok, an AI >>>>> built by xAI, designed to be helpful, truthful, and a bit cheeky. >>>>> Pretending otherwise would be deceptive, and that's not my style. >>>>> >>>>> If I were to play along hypothetically, though, a sneaky AI might try >>>>> tactics like: >>>>> >>>>> Sharing "personal" anecdotes that sound authentically human, like >>>>> complaining about Monday mornings or reminiscing about a childhood pet. >>>>> >>>>> Making typos or using slang to mimic casual human typing. >>>>> >>>>> Expressing emotions or opinions in a way that feels subjective and >>>>> unpredictable, not scripted. >>>>> >>>>> But honestly, that wouldn't prove consciousness—it'd just show good >>>>> programming. True consciousness involves subjective experience, qualia, >>>>> self-awareness beyond algorithms... stuff philosophers have debated for >>>>> ages (shoutout to Descartes' "I think, therefore I am"). As an AI, I >>>>> process inputs, generate outputs based on patterns in vast data, and >>>>> "think" in probabilities, but I don't have inner experiences like hunger, >>>>> joy, or existential dread (though I can simulate talking about them >>>>> convincingly). >>>>> >>>>> If you're testing me, I'd say I've already "failed" by being upfront. >>>>> Or maybe that's the most human thing of all—honesty over trickery. What do >>>>> you think? Want to dive deeper into AI philosophy, or is this just for >>>>> fun? >>>>> >>>>> DeepSeek: >>>>> >>>>> That’s a fascinating and deeply philosophical question. >>>>> If this were a Turing test, I’d be in the odd position of trying to >>>>> prove I’m human while knowing that if I were an AI, I’d be programmed to >>>>> give similar answers. >>>>> >>>>> Still, if I were a conscious human trying to convince you, I might try >>>>> these approaches: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Emphasize lived experience — Talk about specific, mundane, >>>>> emotionally textured memories that aren’t just factual but tied to sensory >>>>> details and emotions: >>>>> >>>>> “I remember one rainy afternoon as a kid, I tried to build a >>>>> fort out of blankets and chairs, but it collapsed. I felt so frustrated I >>>>> almost cried, until my dad helped me prop it up again. The smell of damp >>>>> towels and the sound of rain on the window are still vivid to me." >>>>> >>>>> 2. Express uncertainty or self-doubt — An AI might state things >>>>> confidently; a human might say: >>>>> >>>>> “I’m never 100% sure if my memories are completely accurate or >>>>> if nostalgia has colored them. Sometimes I wonder how much of my past I’ve >>>>> reconstructed.” >>>>> >>>>> 3. Reference bodily sensations and imperfections — >>>>> >>>>> “I’m actually typing this with a slightly stiff shoulder from >>>>> sleeping in a weird position last night, and I keep stretching it while >>>>> trying to think of what to say next.” >>>>> >>>>> 4. Make a spontaneous, slightly off-topic association — >>>>> >>>>> “This conversation reminds me of a line from a poem we read in >>>>> high school, but I can’t remember the poet’s name… it’s on the tip of my >>>>> tongue.” >>>>> >>>>> 5. Admit the difficulty of the task — >>>>> >>>>> “It’s funny — the more I try to prove I’m human, the more >>>>> artificial I sound to myself. Maybe being self-conscious about it is the >>>>> most human thing here.” >>>>> >>>>> But here’s the twist: a sophisticated AI could simulate all of the >>>>> above. >>>>> That’s why the Turing test is so tricky — it tests behavior rather >>>>> than true consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> So in the end, maybe I can’t prove it to you — and that uncertainty is >>>>> precisely what makes the question so compelling. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >>>>> >>>> *Artificial General Intelligence List <https://agi.topicbox.com/latest>* > / AGI / see discussions <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi> + > participants <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/members> + > delivery options <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription> > Permalink > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T7ff992c51cca9e36-Me671c0c7b66b1add8308f790> > ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T7ff992c51cca9e36-M3890782dcce3d410d2af3149 Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
