On 11/8/07, Edward W. Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Jef,
>
> The paper cited below is more relevant to Kolmogorov complexity than
> Solomonoff induction.  I had thought about the use of subroutines before I
> wrote my questioning critique of Solomonoff Induction.
>
> Nothing in it seems to deal with the fact that the descriptive length of
> reality's computations that create an event (the descriptive length that
> is more likely to affect the event's probability), is not necessarily
> correlated with the descriptive length of sensations we receive from such
> events.

Edward -

I'm sorry I'm not going to be able to provide much illumination for
you at this time.  Just the few sentences of yours quoted above, while
of a level of comprehension equal or better than average on this list,
demonstrate epistemological incoherence to the extent I would hardly
know where to begin.

This discussion reminds me of hot rod enthusiasts arguing passionately
about how to build the best racing car, while denigrating any
discussion of entropy as outside the "practical."

Solomonoff induction says something fundamental about intelligence,
contributing a framework upon which more practical pieces must fit,
while saying almost nothing about the specific nature of those pieces.
 Interesting how self-referential is that statement.

"I had thought about the use of subroutines..."

You might want to consider then the theoretical relationship between
"subroutines" and recursive structures.


"...descriptive length of reality's computations..."

More coherently, you can talk only of the descriptive length of a
particular model of 'reality.'


"...that create an event..."

"Events" are very much a property of the observer, having no separate
ontological status.


"...affect the event's probability..."

More coherently, you might restate this as "...reflect the event's
likelihood..."


"...the descriptive length of sensations we receive..."

Who is this "we" that "receives" sensations?  Holy homunculus, Batman,
seems we have a bit of qualia confusion thrown into the mix!


Sorry for my glaring lack of tact.  I mean no disrespect but am short
of time.  Along the lines of the Solomonoff induction of which we
speak, it doesn't much matter where you start; as along as you keep
poking at it you'll tend to get closer to a coherent model of
'reality'.

- Jef

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