Jeff, In your below flame you spent much more energy conveying contempt than knowledge. Since I dont have time to respond to all of your attacks, let us, for example, just look at the last two:
MY PRIOR POST>>>> "...affect the event's probability..." JEFS PUT DOWN 1>>>>More coherently, you might restate this as "...reflect the event's likelihood..." MY COMMENT>>>> At Dragon System, then one of the worlds leading speech recognition companies, I was repeatedly told by our in-house PhD in statistics that likelihood is the measure of a hypothesis matching, or being supported by, evidence. Dragon selected speech recognition word candidates based on the likelihood that the probability distribution of their model matched the acoustic evidence provided by an event, i.e., a spoken utterance. Similarly, if one is drawing balls from a bag that has a distribution of black and white balls, the color of a ball produced by a given random drawing from the bag has a probability based on the distribution in the bag. But one uses the likelihood function to calculate the probability distribution in the bag, from among multiple possible distribution hypothesis, by how well that distribution matches data produced by events. The creation of the event by external reality I was referring to is much more like the utterance of a word (and its observation) or the drawing of ball (and the observation of its color) from a bag than a determination of what probability distribution most likely created it. On the otherhand, trying to understand the complexity that gives rise to such an event would be more like using likelihoods. When I wrote the post you have flamed I was not worrying about trying to be exact in my memo, because I had no idea people on this list wasted their energy correcting such common inexact usages as switching probability and likelihood. But as it turns out in this case my selection of the word probability rather than likelihood seems to be totally correct. MY PRIOR POST>>>> "...the descriptive length of sensations we receive..." JEFS PUT DOWN 2>>>> Who is this "we" that "receives" sensations? Holy homunculus, Batman, seems we have a bit of qualia confusion thrown into the mix! MY COMMENT>>>> Again I did not know that I would be attacked for using such a common English usage as we on this list. Am I to assume that you, Jef, never use the words we or I because you are surrounded by friends so kind as to rudely say Holy homunculus, Batman every time you do. Or, just perhaps, are you a little more normal than that. In addition, the use of the word we or even I does not necessary imply a homunculus. I think most modern understanding of the brain indicates that human consciousness is most probably -- although richly interconnected -- a distributed computation that does not require a homunculus. I like and often use Bernard Baars Theater of Consciousness metaphor. But none of this means it is improper to use the words we or I when referring to ourselves or our consciousnesses. And I think one should be allowed to use the word sensation without being accused of qualia confusion. Jeff, do you ever use the word sensation, or would that be too confusing for you? So, Jeff, if Solomonoff induction is really a concept that can help me get a more coherent model of reality, I would really appreciate someone who had the understanding, intelligence, and friendliness to at least try in relatively simple words to give me pointers as to how and why it is so important, rather someone who picks apart every word I say with minute or often incorrect criticisms. A good example of they type of friendly effort I appreciate is in Lukasz Stafiniak 11/08/07 11:54 AM post to me, which I have not had time yet to fully understand, but which I greatly appreciate for its focused and helpful approach. Ed Porter -----Original Message----- From: Jef Allbright [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, November 08, 2007 12:55 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [agi] How valuable is Solmononoff Induction for real world AGI? On 11/8/07, Edward W. Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Jef, > > The paper cited below is more relevant to Kolmogorov complexity than > Solomonoff induction. I had thought about the use of subroutines > before I wrote my questioning critique of Solomonoff Induction. > > Nothing in it seems to deal with the fact that the descriptive length > of reality's computations that create an event (the descriptive length > that is more likely to affect the event's probability), is not > necessarily correlated with the descriptive length of sensations we > receive from such events. Edward - I'm sorry I'm not going to be able to provide much illumination for you at this time. Just the few sentences of yours quoted above, while of a level of comprehension equal or better than average on this list, demonstrate epistemological incoherence to the extent I would hardly know where to begin. This discussion reminds me of hot rod enthusiasts arguing passionately about how to build the best racing car, while denigrating any discussion of entropy as outside the "practical." Solomonoff induction says something fundamental about intelligence, contributing a framework upon which more practical pieces must fit, while saying almost nothing about the specific nature of those pieces. Interesting how self-referential is that statement. "I had thought about the use of subroutines..." You might want to consider then the theoretical relationship between "subroutines" and recursive structures. "...descriptive length of reality's computations..." More coherently, you can talk only of the descriptive length of a particular model of 'reality.' "...that create an event..." "Events" are very much a property of the observer, having no separate ontological status. "...affect the event's probability..." More coherently, you might restate this as "...reflect the event's likelihood..." "...the descriptive length of sensations we receive..." Who is this "we" that "receives" sensations? Holy homunculus, Batman, seems we have a bit of qualia confusion thrown into the mix! Sorry for my glaring lack of tact. I mean no disrespect but am short of time. Along the lines of the Solomonoff induction of which we speak, it doesn't much matter where you start; as along as you keep poking at it you'll tend to get closer to a coherent model of 'reality'. - Jef ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?&; ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=63052930-ca22e7
