Having a vision-assisted training process would be extremely compelling. Then the user can provide information relevant to comprehending a scene as well as adding word/object associations. Robust sight and sound processing are still kind of a frontier for software, I think. A little good work in that direction probably goes a long way right now.
In Larry Yaeger's Polyworld, the creatures have a sense of sight that at least returns the colour of a creature or object they're facing. The creatures' colours reflect certain variables like health and aggressiveness and blink at various rates. I'm not sure if the creatures perceive only a colour or a table of pixels constituting a frame of view, but even the former seems like a fairly rich input, depending on the sampling rate, given the richness of the environment and the paucity of this capacity in most ecology sims. My 2c On 9/28/08, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [Comment: Aren't logic and common sense *opposed*?] > > Discursive [logical, propositional] Knowledge vs Practical [tacit] Knowledge > http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/wp24mcanulla.pdf > > a) Knowledge: practical and discursive > > Most, if not all understandings of tradition stress the way in which > knowledge and beliefs are transmitted or transferred over time. However, as > we have seen, different perspectives place varying emphases on the types of > knowledge and belief being transferred. Some make practical and tacit > knowledge primary, others make rational and/or intellectual knowledge forms > of knowledge central. However, in principle there is no reason to assume > that both types of knowledge are not important to tradition. Yet to maintain > this necessitates examining to what extent these kind of knowledge are > distinct and/or compatible. It will be suggested below that we might gain a > better grasp of traditions by making a clear distinction between the > different types of knowledge they can transmit. Stompka's unpacking of the > objects of tradition into material and ideal components is instructive here. > For this draws our attention to examine not just the relations between the > different ideas within traditions, but also the relations between people and > the physical objects relevant to a tradition. Drawing on realist social > theory, I suggest drawing a distinction between practical and discursive > forms of knowledge3. > > Practical knowledge > . Centrally concerns subject-object relations e.g. someone's skill in using > a bottle-opener > . Primarily tacit in content, as it involves engaging with reality through > activity and dealings with artifacts (rather than manipulating symbols) > . Cognitive content entails non-verbal theorising and development of skills > (rather than enunciation of propositions) (Archer, 2000: 166) > > Practical knowledge emerges from our active engagement with the world of > objects. In this view pre-verbal practical action is the way in which > infants learn principles of logical reasoning. Learning these principles in > a is necessary and prior to discursive socialisation and the acquisition of > language. However, there is no reason to believe that such non-linguistic > forms of practical action cease following the learning of language (Archer, > 2000: 153). Indeed the practical skills we develop often do not depend in a > direct way upon language e.g. our abilities to use a bottle opener, or to > control car gears through use of a clutch, are something we gain a 'feel' > for. The best kinds of car-user instruction manual do not of themselves help > develop many of the practical skills we need for driving. As such practical > knowledge is regulated by our relations with material culture i.e. the > objects and artifacts we encounter (ibid. 166) Practical knowledge is thus > implicit and tacit, gained through activity rather than through engaging > with linguistic propositions or discursive symbols. When practical knowledge > is transmitted (e.g. in the form of tradition) it is done so in the form of > 'apprenticeship' where skilled individual e.g. Mastercraftsmen or a > Professional demonstrates good practice and offers practical criticism and > evaluation (ibid. 176) Once such skills are acquired, the use of such > practical knowledge often becomes 'second nature'. > > Discursive knowledge > . Centrally concerns subject-subject relations and linguistic communication > . Consists of theories, arguments, social norms and their propositional > formulation (Archer, 2000: 173-176) > . Consist of linguistically generated meaning and symbols > > Discursive knowledge is developed through our linguistic powers to > communicate meaningfully and to attribute meanings to our relations. Thus > discursive knowledge may consist of theories, arguments, social norms and > the kinds of propositions associated with them (e.g. 'maximum liberty > requires a minimal state'). The ideas contained within discursive knowledge > stand in logical relationship to one another and can usually be represented > in propositional forms. It is through discursive knowledge that we develop > and maintain ideational commitments to particular doctrines, theories or > world-views (Archer, 2000: 173-176). Discursive knowledge can act to > constrain and/or enable our projects as actors in the world. In turn, this > discursive knowledge can be elaborated or transformed as a result of our > socio-linguistic interactions. Discursive knowledge is transmitted, or > handed down (e.g. within tradition) through 'scholarship', the teaching of > linguistically encoded theories and propositions. > > b) The interaction between practical and discursive knowledge > If such a distinction between practical and discursive knowledge is accepted > then it is clear that traditions may vary in the extent to which they > consist of each type. For example, a tradition of British farming would > clearly involve a high element of practical knowledge. Conversely, an > academic tradition, such as 'analytic' philosophy, primarily consists of > discursive knowledge. At the same time many other traditions we might pick > out, such as 'British Labourism' may contain significant elements of both > practical and discursive knowledge. > If we accept that our traditions may contain these distinct types of > knowledge a key question is, how do these distinct types of knowledge relate > to one another? To what extent do they interrelate or 'translate' into one > another? Pierre Bourdieu argues that the practical knowledge cannot be > translated into discursive knowledge (echoing certain of Oakeshott's > themes). For Bourdieu, practical and tacit knowledge is simply > incommensurable with discursive knowledge (Archer, 2000: 151). He argues > practice has a logic of immediacy, urgency and pragmatic common sense which > stands opposed to logic of the logician. In Bourdieu's view it is 'a logic > of practice that flouts logical logic' (Bourdieu, 1990: 86, quoted in > Archer, 2000: 151) > In contrast, Archer believes that it is possible to have a significant (but > nowhere near exhaustive) degree of translation between practical and > discursive knowledge. Indeed, she suggests this is exactly what people are > doing in constructing discursive guides for practical action, such as maps > and sheet music. Thus tacit knowledge can be used and 'converted' to > explicitly 14 > codify practices over time. Often discursive knowledge (e.g. in the form of > new theory) is developed with the hope of modifying or improving practices. > In turn, changes in practices and development of new skills sometimes prompt > new discursive representations. However, such translation may not be easy, > or in some instances possible. New theories may not 'work' in practice and > some practices may defy clear discursive articulation. For example extensive > skills in reading music (discursive knowledge) will not improve the playing > of someone who lacks 'feel' for his or her instrument (practical knowledge) > > > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=114414975-3c8e69 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
