To me, computationalism, defined via " Computationalism. = _abstract_ symbol manipulation. "
is an **interpretation** of certain things that occur inside computers sometimes ... The fact that this is a bad interpretation, doesn't imply that computer themselves aren't able to carry out advanced intelligence... -- Ben G On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 4:28 PM, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > Hi all, > This seems to have touched a point of interest. I'll try and address all > the issues raised in one post. I hope I don't miss any of them. Please > remind me if I have. Apologies if I don;t reference the originator of the > query explicitly. You know who you are! > > Re 'defining terms'. > 1) Yes: Theres pages and pages of background information not in the posts. > It is the result of thousands of hours of reading and analysis. Without it > the readership is not 'calibrated' properly and the dialogue is bound to > have its problems. The reader has only been exposed to about 1/50th of the > total work, so please don;t assume that any of the terms are poorly defined. > They are only.poorly defined here and so far, > > 1a) Here's the basics of the term "visual scene". This is long proven > empirical physiology. I already said: it is the occipital lobe deliverable. > Very specific neurons, well known, highly documented, are responsible. > Officially no-one knows 'how'/'why' visual experience results happens. The > official position only declared what does it. "Visual Scene" = that > construct that is replaced by a roughly hemispherical gloom/blackness when > you close your eyes. It is highly localised to specific neuron populations > (occipital V4 does colour, for example) and has been studied for decades. > Everyone who studies cognition should be aware of this empirical knowledge. > I do not need to specify it further or justify it. The evidence speaks for > itself. An entire empirical science paradigm call the 'neural correlates of > consciousness' has been set up specifically to isolate the neural basis. All > experiential fields are the same. They are all cranial central nervous > system deliverables. This means audition, haptic, olfaction, gustation, > vision, situational and primordial emotions and all internal imagined > versions of these (including the visual imagery in the post by JLM). My > argument deals only with the visual scene. > > 1b) So, in answer to another comment from one of the posts: "visual scene", > specifically: "I assume you mean the original image impressed on your > retina". No, I do not mean this. The molecular machinations of the entire > peripheral nervous system, including the 'peripherals' of the central > nervous system..... are 100% empirically proven for 100 years to be > experientially inert. You do not see with your eyes. Vision occurs in the > occipital. Please read the literature. Peripheral sensory transduction is > not experienced. Central perceptual fields are projected to the periphery. > This is physiology. EG. For the peripheral insult sensory transduction, the > term nociception is used. PAIN, the experience, is added in the CNS and > projected (often rather badly) to the site of origin. There is an entire > collection of nomenclature established by physiology to enable descriptive > specificity..I should not have to provide any more information along these > lines. Please read the literature. There's lots of it. I can supply refs if > you need them. > > 1c) Computationalism. = _abstract_ symbol manipulation. This is meant in > specific contrast to the manipulation of _natural_ symbol manipulation. > Analog computing is also COMP. This means that all computing based on the > various calculii are COMP. It means that all machines using any sort of > abstract mathematical or logical framework where the semantics of the > symbols need extra documentation... are COMP. The basic defs: > See: > (i) Moor, J. 'The Dartmouth College Artificial Intelligence Conference: > The next fifty years', Ai Magazine vol. 27, no. 4, 2006. 87-91. > (ii) Beer, R. D. 'A Dynamical-Systems Perspective on Agent Environment > Interaction', Artificial Intelligence vol. 72, no. 1-2, 1995. 173-215. > > RE: The nature of the COMP = false as an argument. > 2) I don't intend to formalise the argument any further here. I have given > the precis. The two papers I mentioned are in review. One of them for 18 > months already. Very painful. When they come out they can speak for > themselves. > > 3) Please do not taint my words with any attributions in respect of being > 'philosophical'. ;-) I love reading philosophy and have internalised > truckloads....but this is irrelevant...When I say this is an empirical > argument I mean it. All I do is aggregate well known (but > hyper-cross-disciplinary) fact into one place. I follow the path of least > resistance to what it says of the natural world. If the empirical evidence > said anything else I'd say something else. > > 4) I'll say it again: this is an empirical argument... therefore: If you > want to helpfully counter the argument then please deliver the novel > evidence to the contrary that counters the evidence I give and explain why. > Show references. Point to a history of facts. Then I can respond because i > have encountered something I must account for which alters the implications > of the evidence. If this cannot be done then the statements you make are > empty beliefs and I can do nothing with them. I defer to real evidence. > Nothing else. And I require that of all critique. I am absolutely STOKED if > you can set me straight empirically. I relish it. I need it. > > 5) To be more blunt about it: I cannot respond to any empty meta-belief > (belief about belief) such as "I find it unconvincing", "What if it > doesn't/wont't/isn't?", "This seems wrong", "I find this implausible" and > all manner of other such statements. If you can't deliver the evidence to > the contrary then please don't say anything. Educate yourself in the > empirical areas you find problematic and then come back and tell me exactly > where I am wrong and why. A viable discussion will ensue.. > > RE: Motivation > 6) The only reason I have made such an effort to complete the refutation of > COMP (you have seen only 1 way, there are 3 others) is that despite being > publicly established as merely "conjecture" (i) and a "theoretical claim" > (ii), for 50 years it has continued to be entertained by computer science/AI > projects as if it was a "law of nature". It has no proof. There is merely a > "failure to refute". This situation has been part of the framework of > justification (implicitly and explicitly by various research efforts) that > real AGI might result from COMP principles. I am here to put that > expectation to death once and for all: so that funds may be more cautiously > directed and expectations be more wisely managed. > > 7) Another refutation of COMP" > Bringsjord, S. 'The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind', > Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. LIX, no. 1, 1999. 41-69 > > 8) Another refutation of COMP comes by appropriately contextualising the > 'No Free Lunch' Theorem(of machine learning) into a context of cognition > during a scientific act. In that circumstance NFL applies to a refutation of > COMP. > Koppen, M., Wolpert, D. H. and Macready, W. G. 'Remarks on a recent > paper on the ''No free lunch'' theorems', IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary > Computation vol. 5, no. 3, 2001. 295-296. > Wolpert, D. H. 'The lack of A priori distinctions between learning > algorithms', Neural Computation vol. 8, no. 7, 1996. 1341-1390. > Wolpert, D. H. 'The existence of A priori distinctions between learning > algorithms', Neural Computation vol. 8, no. 7, 1996. 1391-1420. > > RE: Wider implications > 7) In line with (6), I need draw no further connection to a solution to the > problem of consciousness generally. The claim of the COMP argument is very > specific. It merely tells us that a turing machine cannot 'compute' a > scientist in an authentic act of original science using visual observation > of the novel distal natural world. On generalisation the important > implication is that the term "simulated scientist" is an oxymoron. A logical > impossibility. > > 8) Other connections to the physics and role of consciousness in cognition > and intelligent behaviour generally, whilst very interesting and much more > important, are not part of this COMP discussion. > > 9) There is a more fundamental issue which I have also not included thus > far which I think may be important here..."INVERSE or ILL-DEFINED PROBLEMS". > The expectation that source reconstruction from a remote data-slice can > occur is fatally and a-priori discountable. To be rather more practical > about it...I am involved in an EEG/Epilepsy group. The explanation of the > origins of EEG (a surface field structure) is literally identical to the > problem of explanation of the originator of retinal photon impact. Science > knows that the former is an ill-defined problem and does not claim to have > acquired the solution. It knows that the models are metaphors and cannot > claim any further veridicality. Indeed it regards the problem as extreme and > unresolved. How is it that anyone can assume that vision, an even harder and > structurally identical inverse problem, is somehow possible with only the > retinal impact? Please read Nunez for the appropriate background: > Nunez, P. L. and Srinivasan, R., Electric fields of the brain : the > neurophysics of EEG, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, > 2006 > > I am realising that I may have a contribution to make to AGI by helping > strengthen its science base. I've run out of Sunday, so I'd like to leave > the discussion there... to be continued sometime. > > Meanwhile I'd encourage everyone to get used to the idea that to be > involved in AGI is to _not_ be involved in purely COMP principles. Purely > COMP = traditional domain-bound AI. It will produce very good results in > specific problem areas and will be fragile and inflexible when encountering > novelty. AI will remain a perfectly valid target for very exciting COMP > based solutions. However those solutions will never be AGI. Continuation > with purely COMP approach is a strategically fatal flaw which will result in > a club, not a scientific discipline. This is of great concern to me. Please > sit back and let this realisation wash over you. It's what I had to do. I > used to think in COMP terms too. And have fun! This is supposed to be fun! > > cheers > Colin Hales > > Ben Goertzel wrote: > > > The argument seems wrong to me intuitively, but I'm hard-put to argue > against it because the terms are so unclearly defined ... for instance I > don't really know what you mean by a "visual scene" ... > > I can understand that to create a form of this argument worthy of being > carefully debated, would be a lot more work than writing this summary email > you've given. > > So, I agree with your judgment not to try to extensively debate the > argument in its current sketchily presented form. > > If you do choose to present it carefully at some point, I encourage you to > begin by carefully defining all the terms involved ... otherwise it's really > not possible to counter-argue in a useful way ... > > thx > ben g > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 12:31 AM, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> I can give the highly abridged flow of the argument: >> >> !) It refutes COMP , where COMP = Turing machine-style abstract symbol >> manipulation. In particular the 'digital computer' as we know it. >> 2) The refutation happens in one highly specific circumstance. In being >> false in that circumstance it is false as a general claim. >> 3) The circumstances: If COMP is true then it should be able to implement >> an artificial scientist with the following faculties: >> (a) scientific behaviour (goal-delivery of a 'law of nature', an >> abstraction BEHIND the appearances of the distal natural world, not merely >> the report of what is there), >> (b) scientific observation based on the visual scene, >> (c) scientific behaviour in an encounter with radical novelty. (This is >> what humans do) >> >> The argument's empirical knowledge is: >> 1) The visual scene is visual phenomenal consciousness. A highly specified >> occipital lobe deliverable. >> 2) In the context of a scientific act, scientific evidence is 'contents of >> phenomenal consciousness'. You can't do science without it. In the context >> of this scientific act, visual P-consciousness and scientific evidence are >> identities. P-consciousness is necessary but on its own is not sufficient. >> Extra behaviours are needed, but these are a secondary consideration here. >> >> NOTE: Do not confuse "scientific observation" with the "scientific >> measurement", which is a collection of causality located in the distal >> external natural world. (Scientific measurement is not the same thing as >> scientific evidence, in this context). The necessary feature of a visual >> scene is that it operate whilst faithfully inheriting the actual causality >> of the distal natural world. You cannot acquire a law of nature without this >> basic need being met. >> >> 3) Basic physics says that it is impossible for a brain to create a visual >> scene using only the inputs acquired by the peripheral stimulus received at >> the retina. This is due to fundamentals of quantum degeneracy. Basically >> there are an infinite number of distal external worlds that can deliver the >> exact same photon impact. The transduction that occurs in the retinal >> rod/cones is entirely a result of protein isomerisation. All information >> about distal origins is irretievably gone. An impacting photon could have >> come across the room or across the galaxy. There is no information about >> origins in the transduced data in the retina. >> >> That established, you are then faced with a paradox: >> >> (i) (3) says a visual scene is impossible. >> (ii) Yet the brain makes one. >> (iii) To make the scene some kind of access to distal spatial relations >> must be acquired as input data in addition to that from the retina. >> (iv) There are only 2 places that can come from... >> (a) via matter (which we already have - retinal impact at the >> boundary that is the agent periphery) >> (b) via space (at the boundary of the matter of the brain with >> space, the biggest boundary by far). >> So, the conclusion is that the brain MUST acquire the necessary data via >> the spatial boundary route. You don't have to know how. You just have no >> other choice. There is no third party in there to add the necessary data and >> the distal world is unknown. There is literally nowhere else for the data to >> come from. Matter and Space exhaust the list of options. (There is alway >> magical intervention ... but I leave that to the space cadets.) >> >> That's probably the main novelty for the reader to to encounter. But we >> are not done yet. >> >> Next empirical fact: >> (v) When you create a turing-COMP substrate the interface with space is >> completely destroyed and replaced with the randomised machinations of the >> matter of the computer manipulating a model of the distal world. All actual >> relationships with the real distal external world are destroyed. In that >> circumstance the COMP substrate is implementing the science of an encounter >> with a model, not an encounter with the actual distal natural world. >> >> No amount of computation can make up for that loss, because you are in a >> circumstance of an intrinsically unknown distal natural world, (the novelty >> of an act of scientific observation). >> . >> => COMP is false. >> ====== >> OK. There are subtleties here. >> The refutation is, in effect, a result of saying you can't do it (replace >> a scientist with a computer) because you can't simulate inputs. It is just >> the the nature of 'inputs' has been traditionally impoverished by assumption >> born merely of cross-disciplinary blindness.. Not enough quantum mechanics >> or electrodynamics is done by those exposed to 'COMP' principles. >> >> This result, at first appearance, says "you can't simulate a scientist". >> But you can! If you already know what is out there in the natural world then >> you can simulate a scientific act. But you don't - by definition - you are >> doing science to find out! So it's not that you can't simulate a scientist, >> it is just that in order to do it you already have to know everything, so >> you don't want to ... it's useless. So the words 'refutation of COMP by an >> attempted COMP implementation of a scientist' have to be carefully >> contrasted with the words "you can't simulate a scientist". >> >> The self referential use of scientific behaviour as scientific evidence >> has cut logical swathes through all sorts of issues. COMP is only one of >> them. My AGI benchmark and design aim is "the artificial scientist". Note >> also that this result does not imply that real AGI can only be organic like >> us. It means that real AGI must have new chips that fully capture all the >> inputs and make use of them to acquire knowledge the way humans do. A >> separate matter altogether. COMP, as an AGI designer' option, is out of the >> picture. >> >> I think this just about covers the basics. The papers are dozens of pages. >> I can't condense it any more than this..I have debated this so much it's way >> past its use-by date. Most of the arguments go like this: "But you CAN!...". >> I am unable to defend such 'arguments from under-informed-authority' ... I >> defer to the empirical reality of the situation and would prefer that it be >> left to justify itself. I did not make any of it up. I merely observed. . >> ...and so if you don't mind I'd rather leave the issue there. .. >> >> regards, >> >> Colin Hales >> >> >> >> Mike Tintner wrote: >> >>> Colin: >>> >>> 1) Empirical refutation of computationalism... >>> >>> .. interesting because the implication is that if anyone >>> doing AGI lifts their finger over a keyboard thinking they can be >>> directly involved in programming anything to do with the eventual >>> knowledge of the creature...they have already failed. I don't know >>> whether the community has internalised this yet. >>> >>> Colin, >>> >>> I'm sure Ben is right, but I'd be interested to hear the essence of your >>> empirical refutation. Please externalise it so we can internalise it :) >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------- >>> agi >>> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >>> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >>> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; >>> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com >>> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------- >> agi >> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; >> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com >> > > > > -- > Ben Goertzel, PhD > CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC > Director of Research, SIAI > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > "Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first > overcome " - Dr Samuel Johnson > > > ------------------------------ > *agi* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/> | > Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > > ------------------------------ > *agi* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/> | > Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome " - Dr Samuel Johnson ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=114414975-3c8e69 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
