I am not sure what you meant to actually say in your response.
I could see that it was laced with unwarranted sarcasm in different directions
(which is unpleasant but perfectly fine with me.)
The purpose of my original message was to point out that the difficulties of a
negotiated settlement are not simply abut getting ULFA to the table; that even
if one were to go to the GOI with a demand for limited autonomy, it might be
met with no less disdain and even brutal force, for reasons of political
economy. The Indian state does not suffer certain forms of dissent such as ones
that call into question the terms of the union, priveleges of the political and
administrative elite, the power linkages that sustain it. (And to be fair, the
elite of no state would suffer such dissent easily.)
The implication is that securing meaningful autonomy is going to take much
stronger pressure than the ULFA can exert through its militant activities. A
broadbased people's movement will be needed. Formation of public opinion will
be crucial.
Santanu.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ram Sarangapani [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 12:34 PM
> To: Roy, Santanu
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [Assam] GOI-ULFA Negotiations II
>
>
> >There is a presumption that the main obstacle to a negotiated
> settlement >between the ULFA and the Govt. Of india is the question of
> absolute sovereignty >for Assam
>
> That is a new twist. Sure had a lot of us fooled. And all this time,
> we were under the impression that ULFA was all about the issue of
> sovereignty.
> Why, in fact, the last time they backed out of negotiations because
> 'sovereignty' wasn't on the table.
>
> >Indeed, it as been suggested by many that but for the demand for
> sovereignty, it >would be easy to arrive at settlement where, for
> example
>
> Maybe some do, but most just want the two parties at the discussion
> table first, then maybe something beneficial could be hammared out.
> Then there is feeling that Assam may after all have peace.
>
> >and the impression is that in fact, the government of India is
> actually quite willing >to grant that.
>
> The GOI has on occassion talked about autonomy for Kasmir with some
> caveats. Then there are several states that have been expressing
> interest in autonomy.
>
> There is a higher degree of success for some kind of autonomy, then
> for a hubris- loaded demand for sovereignty.
>
> IMHO, if a number of states (not just NE) formed a coalition of sorts
> to demand for more autonomy, there are better chances for success.
>
> >The history of India in the last 50 years is one of moving towards
> greater >centralization of powers. It is the centralization which
> provides the economic and >political rents that the civil servants and
> politicians make in Delhi - and distribute >to their lower fiefs in
> the states. Rivers of blood will have to flow before they give >even
> one bit of it.> By a negotiated settlement with insurgents, govt of
> India >means two things: i) handing out more doles - as grants, as
> bridges, roads and >universities
> > ii) handing over political power (along with slush funds)
> at the state level to >former leaders of insurgencies.
>
> If all this true and tested, then why all the fuss about 'negotiation'
> when we know the GOI will ONLY give up the 2 listed above. If rivers
> of blood have to flow before the GOI gives up the ghost, then in the
> practical sense, there are only 2 options:
>
> a)Set the country aflame by insurgency & mayhem or whatever
> b)Negotiate so that the 2 listed above is handed out by the GOI.
>
> > This is not a matter of opinion - its the construction of
> every agreement that the >GOI has signed
>
> The keyword is "agreement". Didn't the other parties sign on the
> dotted line. If these are sham agreements, then all parties are
> culpable. Why blame only the GOI. Were the other parties sleeping
> during the negotiations?
>
> > The GOI's strategy is to wait and hope that all militancy
> will eventually tire and >get corrupted to a degree that
> doles and state level ministries can buy out. Then >it can
> just do another Assam accord of 1985.
>
> Whose fault is that? If the militancy don't tire and don't get
> corrupted, and be bought, the GOI's strategy would fail, wouldn't it?
>
> --Ram
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 6/3/05, Roy, Santanu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > There is a presumption that the main obstacle to a
> negotiated settlement between the ULFA and the Govt. Of india
> is the question of absolute sovereignty for Assam. Indeed, it
> as been suggested by many that but for the demand for
> sovereignty, it would be easy to arrive at settlement where,
> for example, Assam could easily gain a high degree of
> autonomy - and the impression is that in fact, the government
> of India is actually quite willing to grant that.
> >
> > Nothing could be further from truth.
> >
> > Let me suggest that on its own, the government of India is
> absolutely not willing and has never - since 1950 - granted
> one additional iota of autonomy or transferred one iota of
> actual power to the states or carried out a single
> constitutional amendment that transfers functions to the
> states. The history of India in the last 50 years is one of
> moving towards greater centralization of powers. It is the
> centralization which provides the economic and political
> rents that the civil servants and politicians make in Delhi -
> and distribute to their lower fiefs in the states. Rivers of
> blood will have to flow before they give even one bit of it.
> >
> > By a negotiated settlement with insurgents, govt of India
> means two things:
> > i) handing out more doles - as grants, as bridges, roads
> and universities
> > ii) handing over political power (along with slush funds)
> at the state level to former leaders of insurgencies.
> >
> > This is not a matter of opinion - its the construction of
> every agreement that the GOI has signed. From the point of
> the rulers in Delhi, the issue is very clear. Giving one
> additional degree of autonomy to one state is going to open
> the floodgates and unravel the nature of power structure of
> the Indian "union". As it is, economic liberalization has
> made many of the states more powerful than ever imaginable in
> a socialist economy.
> >
> > The GOI's strategy is to wait and hope that all militancy
> will eventually tire and get corrupted to a degree that doles
> and state level ministries can buy out. Then it can just do
> another Assam accord of 1985.
> >
> > For the people of Assam, short of a fundamental
> restucturing of constitutional power, every other accord will
> just as meaningless as the accord of 1985.
> >
> > Santanu.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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>
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