[snip] > > > Because I do not trust tinydns to do the job. I know a guy that has > > > been > > > working several years with the dot se top domain..., and I do take his > > > word > > > for it... > > Ok... you don't trust tinydns to do the job. Fair enough. Can I ask > > why? > I had the whole icq chat in my history file that was lost after a session with > ez-drive ;) So..., I can't remember specifically where the problems lies. I > can ask him again if you like? Mmm, Oden, that's double standards when you compare to ... this:
[snip] > As I'm not in the position to tell if bind does the job worse than whatever > else name server software I can't really say. I do have to trust that the de > facto standard name server software works. If it didn't work you would surely > be notified from a bunch of angry customers. Switching to djbdns is not an > option for me in the near future I'm afraid. > > I know the ISC "support" sucks, but what can you do about it? People do trust > companies like Microsoft, so... ;) Mmm, as long as it is "free as in free beer" again? After the initial rise in temperature I see the tragic irony in this one, so leave the fire extinguisher on the wall. But continuation of this line of thinking would have kept us in the Dark Ages of Computing... However, I'm afraid, Vincent, the battle has been lost already now that ISC has corrupted the Internet decision making process. (That is, apart from a sudden increase in user base.) Only a major security crisis(*) in the root servers due to BIND screw-ups could potentially revert this. Even the big players who pay for advanced warning will be bitten one day because redrawing into secrecy will make the BIND programmers even more lazy/lousy... Guy (*)One that comes out in the open, that is. A really smart hacker would leave services intact after the initial break-in. Since named crashes once in a while anyway, nothing but excellent an NIDS can distinguish an attack from a "genuine" crash. It is tempting to believe that there are already a bunch of servers compromised and silently serve as cloaks for other attacks.
