On 2016-11-09 10:58, Gervase Markham wrote:
At the moment, Firefox recognises an EE cert as a server cert if it has an EKU extension with id-kp-serverAuth, or if it has no EKU at all.
So not when the anyExtendedKeyUsage is present? > On 17th of Feb 2013, Mozilla published CA policy 2.1, which required > adherence to the BRs (version 1.1.5).[0] > > Since the very first version of the BRs[1], EKU and id-kp-serverAuth > has been mandatory for EE server certificates. I can't actually find this anymore in the current BRs.
So, it is now possible to change Firefox to mandate the presence of id-kp-serverAuth for EE server certs from Mozilla-trusted roots? Or is there some reason I've missed we can't do that? The advantage of doing this is that it makes it much easier to scope our root program to avoid capturing certs it's not meant to capture.
I wanted to look up stats to see how common this still is. But I sort of have a problem with this, since the EKU is the best indicator I have to know if something needs to comply with the BRs or not.
But I guess I can at least let it give a message when no EKU is present. Kurt _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

