Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 05/12/16 12:43, Brian Smith wrote:
>> Let's consider the cases:
>>
>> A root CA: It is in scope if it has the SSL trust bit.
>>
>> An intermediate CA: It is in scope unless all the trusted certificates
>> issued for it have an EKU that excludes id-kp-serverAuth.
>
> No; it's in scope unless it has constraints which prevent the issue of
> (or rather, the trust of) certificates which contain id-kp-serverAuth.

Note I said "issued for", not "issued by". In particular, we are
saying the same thing, except that my statement acknowledges that an
intermediate CA may have multiple (intermediate) certificates with
different EKU (or name) constraints.

>> This is true regardless of whether you require an explicit id-kp-serverAuth
>> in the end-entity certificates, and/or if you base it on the subjectAltName
>> entries like I suggest, right? Because, at any time, the CA could issue an
>> end-entity certificate with id-kp-serverAuth in its EKU and/or a
>> certificate with a dNSName or iPAddress in its subjectAltNames.
>
> Right, so your initial formulation is not correct. It's in scope whether
> or not "all the trusted certificates issued for it [so far] have an EKU
> that excludes id-kp-serverAuth".

It's in scope regardless of the contents of the certificates issued
*by* it. The certificates issued *for* a CA are the intermediate CA
certificates that chain to it. The certificates issued *by* a CA are
the end-entity (or intermediate, if no path length constraints)
certificates.

Note that your proposal is talking about requiring id-kp-serverAuth in
the end-entity certificates issued *by* the CA, which shouldn't matter
insofar as determining scope is concerned.

>> However, I do think that if a CA certificate is name constrained to not
>> allow any dNSName or iPAddress names, and/or it EKU that doesn't contain
>> id-kp-serverAuth, then it shouldn't be in scope of the proposal. Either
>> condition is sufficient.
>
> Are there not other relevant name types, such as svrName (or whatever
> it's called)?

Fair point. But the constraint can be specified as a whitelist instead
of a blacklist: If the subjectAltName (and subject CN) consists only
of emailAddress and/or other non-webby names then it isn't in scope,
otherwise it is in scope.

Cheers,
Brian
-- 
https://briansmith.org/
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