Rob Stradling <[email protected]> wrote:

> Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy already requires that "issuance
> of certificates to be used for SSL-enabled servers must also conform to"
> the BRs, and most other browser providers already require this too.
>
> For Subscriber Certificates, the CABForum BRs already require that...
>   "F. extKeyUsage (required)
>    Either the value id‐kp‐serverAuth [RFC5280] or id‐kp‐clientAuth
>    [RFC5280] or both values MUST be present."
>
> Since the policy already requires #3, ISTM that the technical
> implementation should enforce #3 (unless there's a really good reason not
> to).
>

The policy (including the BRs) can and should be changed.

Notice in the BRs that the KeyUsage extension (not to be confused with the
ExtendedKeyUsage extension we're talking about here) is optional. Why is it
OK to be optional? Because the default implementation allows all usages,
including in particular the usages that browsers need.

Similarly, why are name constraints optional? Because the default is no
name constraints. Why are policy constraints optional? Because the default
is no constraints. In all these cases the defaults might be not as strict
as possible but they work out OK.


> For it to make any sense to not enforce #3 technically, there would need
> to be cross-industry agreement (and a corresponding update to the BRs) that
> end-entity serverAuth certs need not contain the EKU extension. Good luck
> with that!!
>

I would expect it to be easier than most other changes to the BRs, because
it doesn't require anybody to do any work.


> How much effort should we go to just to shave 21 bytes off the size of
> each end-entity serverAuth cert?
>

My proposal requires as close to zero effort as any proposal to change the
BRs.

In isolation, shaving off 21 bytes isn't a huge win. However, IIRC, based
on the last time we measured this, combined with other changes it adds up
to be, on average, larger than the size of the SCTs that we're adding to
certs and/or less than the size of an additional OCSP response (without
embedded signing cert) and/or the cost of a minimal OCSP response signing
cert.

Why don't browsers support OCSP multi-stapling (OCSP for intermediate CA
certs)? Part of the reason is that it would be inefficient because
certificates and OCSP responses are too big. Also some choose to avoid
using X.509 certificates completely due to size issues.

People are working on certificate compression to make certificates smaller.
See, for example, the messages in this thread:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22065.html. Also see
Google's QUIC protocol, which implements compression. Unfortunately, not
every implementation can support GZIP-based compression, and it's a good
idea to minimize the size of the decompressed certs in any case. Also see
the work that BoringSSL/Chrome is doing to de-dupe certs in memory because
certs are taking up too much memory.

Also, like I said in my previous message, it seems like requiring the EKU
in the end-entity certificates doesn't actually solve the problem that it
was proposed to solve, so I'm not sure if there is any motivation for
requiring it now.

Cheers,
Brian
-- 
https://briansmith.org/
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