Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 05/12/16 12:43, Brian Smith wrote:
>> However, I do think that if a CA certificate is name constrained to not
>> allow any dNSName or iPAddress names, and/or it EKU that doesn't contain
>> id-kp-serverAuth, then it shouldn't be in scope of the proposal. Either
>> condition is sufficient.
>
> Can we get a whitelist of types we care about? Note that we care about
> email as well as server certs.
>
> dNSName
> iPAddress (this covers both v4 and v6?)
> rfc822Name
> SRVName
Here are the choices (from RFC 5280):
GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
otherName [0] OtherName,
rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
dNSName [2] IA5String,
x400Address [3] ORAddress,
directoryName [4] Name,
ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
Note that RFC 4985 defines srvName as an otherName { id-on 7}. See
also
http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8
If the issuing CA is trusted for email (as determined by root email
trust bit, and there are no EKU constraints that exclude
id-kp-emailProtection), then a certificate with an rfc822Name would be
in scope, unless all such names were excluded by the name constraints.
If the issuing CA is trusted for TLS (as determined by root SSL trust
bit, and there are no EKUs constraints that exclude id-kp-serverAuth),
then a certificate with dNSName and iPAddress or srvName (a subtype of
otherName), would be in scope, unless all such names were excluded by
the name constraints.
Not sure about whether you would want to include the URL type.
Cheers,
Brian
--
https://briansmith.org/
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