On 03/12/16 03:42, Brian Smith wrote: > The EKU extension indicates the limits of the key usage. A certificate > without an EKU extension has no limits on its key usage. In particular, > when no EKU is present, id-kp-serverAuth is allowed, as far as the CA is > concerned. Many X.509 features are defined this way, where the default is > "no limit"--pretty much all of them. The advantage of omitting these > extensions is that the resulting certificates are smaller. Smaller > certificates are better. Therefore, Mozilla should encourage behaviors that > result in smaller certificates, including in particular omitting the EKU > extension and other extensions where the defaults "work."
But this is not the only factor. > The solution to this problem is to get rid of the idea of "intent" from the > CA policy (including the baseline requirements, or in spit of the BRs if > the BRs cannot be changed), so that all that matters is the RFC 5280 > "trusted for" semantics. We intend to do that for the Mozilla policy. However, that then widens the scope of the policy massively. It makes it cover, if I remember the example correctly, millions of EKU-less certs on smart cards used for a government ID program in Europe. These are not intended for server use, but they are trusted for it, and so a misissuance here such that something appears in a CN or SAN that is domain-name-like would mean that cert could be used for a server. This is why a change to "trusted for" rather than "intended for" needs to be accompanied by a change to explicitly require id-kp-serverAuth, in order to keep the scope correct, and stop the Mozilla policy extending to cover certificates it's not supposed to cover and which CAs don't want it to cover. Requiring that every issuance under the publicly-trusted roots which is using no EKU and which is not intended for server auth change to use an EKU which explicitly does not include id-kp-serverAuth would have unknown ramifications of unknown size. Changing both the Mozilla policy and Firefox to require id-kp-serverAuth is reasonably confidently known to have only minor ramifications, and we know what they will be. > I'd like to point out that I've given the above explanation to you multiple > times. Have I explained why it's not determinative multiple times, or is this the first time? :-) >> The advantage of doing this is that it makes it much easier to scope our >> root program to avoid capturing certs it's not meant to capture. > > This is not true. Since no EKU extension implies id-kp-serverAuth, certs > without an EKU extension or with an EKU extension containing > id-kp-serverAuth or anyExtendedKeyUsage (even though Firefox doesn't > support that) should be within the scope of the program. But given the current situation, doing that extends the scope of the program beyond where we want it to be, and where CAs want it to be. Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

