Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote: > On 03/12/16 03:42, Brian Smith wrote: > > The solution to this problem is to get rid of the idea of "intent" from > the > > CA policy (including the baseline requirements, or in spit of the BRs if > > the BRs cannot be changed), so that all that matters is the RFC 5280 > > "trusted for" semantics. > > We intend to do that for the Mozilla policy. However, that then widens > the scope of the policy massively. It makes it cover, if I remember the > example correctly, millions of EKU-less certs on smart cards used for a > government ID program in Europe. These are not intended for server use, > but they are trusted for it, and so a misissuance here such that > something appears in a CN or SAN that is domain-name-like would mean > that cert could be used for a server. >
If certificates without an EKU have dNSName or iPAddress subjectAltName entries, then they should be considered in scope. Otherwise they don't need to be considered in scope as long as Firefox doesn't use the Subject CN as a dNSName. You've already started down the path of fixing the Subject CN issue in https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1245280 and maybe elsewhere. > This is why a change to "trusted for" rather than "intended for" needs > to be accompanied by a change to explicitly require id-kp-serverAuth, in > order to keep the scope correct, and stop the Mozilla policy extending > to cover certificates it's not supposed to cover and which CAs don't > want it to cover. > See above. I bet that you can make the subjectAltName restrictions tighter so that "trusted for" already works without requiring an explicit EKU. > Requiring that every issuance under the publicly-trusted roots which is > using no EKU and which is not intended for server auth change to use an > EKU which explicitly does not include id-kp-serverAuth would have > unknown ramifications of unknown size. This is a textbook instance of FUD. > Changing both the Mozilla policy > and Firefox to require id-kp-serverAuth is reasonably confidently known > to have only minor ramifications, and we know what they will be. > AFAICT almost all Mozilla software except for Firefox and Thunderbird, would still trust the EKU-less certificates for id-kp-serverAuth. Thus requiring an explicit id-kp-serverAuth in Firefox wouldn't even have the intended ramifications for all of Mozilla's products. Also, pretty much all non-Mozilla software is using RFC 5280 semantics already. So, such a change wouldn't do anything to help non-Mozilla software nor even all of Mozilla's products. > >> The advantage of doing this is that it makes it much easier to scope our > >> root program to avoid capturing certs it's not meant to capture. > > > > This is not true. Since no EKU extension implies id-kp-serverAuth, certs > > without an EKU extension or with an EKU extension containing > > id-kp-serverAuth or anyExtendedKeyUsage (even though Firefox doesn't > > support that) should be within the scope of the program. > > But given the current situation, doing that extends the scope of the > program beyond where we want it to be, and where CAs want it to be. > Limiting the scope to things that contain dNSName and iPAddress subjectAltNames addresses this, right? And, more importantly, it addresses it in a way that makes sense considering that other software doesn't require an explicit EKU, because it doesn't rely on Firefox-specific semantics. To be clear, I'm not against the idea of Firefox making a technical change that others have to catch up with, like name constraints. However, that should be a last resort. There seems to be a better alternative in this case. Cheers, Brian -- https://briansmith.org/ _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

