Thank you again to Andrew Ayer for the original report. As the community will have seen, these were the tip of an iceberg of reasonably large proportions. While it's true that we are still waiting for Symantec to provide information about e.g. how many certificates have been re-validated and how many revoked, I think there is now enough clarity for us to start a discussion about next steps. We need to decide:
a) whether what has been revealed should lead to any changes in Mozilla's Root Store Policy; b) whether the failures of Symantec and those to whom they had delegated signing authority are sufficient to warrant sanction and, if so, what. Policy Change ------------- Here are some proposals for policy change. Please do comment on these or suggest others. Even if we wanted to revoke all of the certs from CrossCert or some other Symantec RA, that would be effectively technically impossible, because they are not marked in such a way as to make them identifiable. Additionally, the audit situation for these RAs, in terms of timeliness, comprehensiveness and so on, was pretty terrible and Symantec did not notice. Policy Proposal 1: require all CAs to arrange it so that certs validated by an RA are issued from one or more intermediates dedicated solely to that RA, with such intermediates clearly labelled with the name of the RA in the Subject. If we enact Policy Proposal 1, that allows RAs to be cut off, and also provides a natural point for the CP/CPS and audits of the RA to be monitored in the CCADB, because they would be attached by the CA to the issuing intermediate for that RA. Symantec's oversight of their RAs was clearly inadequate; various forms of misissuance were not detected. Policy Proposal 2: something like, require all CAs to make it so that any internal tests or audits of certificate quality cover RA-issued certificates as well as their own. (Not sure how one could police this.) One Symantec RA, Certsuperior, had a dreadful audit: https://bug1334377.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=8831930 Symantec required the issues to be fixed and a 90-day action plan was executed to fix them. However, no certificates issued during the period of suspect operations were checked to see if the poor practice had caused misissuance. Policy Proposal 3: All qualified audits must be disclosed to Mozilla, even if the intent is remediation and re-audit. The trouble with this would be, I suspect, that the day before the audit is due to end the CA can, seeing the writing on the wall, send the auditor away instead of letting them complete their work. So a bad audit is never finished. Or are there professional ethics rules about that? It's difficult to write a policy about what Symantec should have done when faced with such a litany of failure; I would have thrown Certsuperior overboard immediately if I were them and had read that audit. At the very least, all certificates issued while it was true that e.g.: * There as no legible CPS; * inadequately-trained personnel were doing issuance; * the network was an insecure mess; and * non-trusted staff had access to issuance should have been fully re-validated. How can we write something to cover this? Policy Proposal 4: When a qualified audit calls the quality of domain validation into question, all certificates affected by the audit finding must have their domains revalidated after the problem is remedied. But even that doesn't really cover it. If their validation practices were theoretically fine but their network was an insecure mess, anyone could have got in and done anything. Perhaps we just need to require audit disclosure and say that if Mozilla ever comes across an audit like that, we'll use the fact that the RA has their own intermediate to just cut them off. Failures -------- As noted by module peer Ryan Sleevi, this is not the first time Symantec has had difficulties with misissued "test" certificates. It is disappointing that investigations related to the last incident did not turn up the problems which have now been discovered. Various forms of investigation and remediation were not, apparently, applied to Symantec's RA network in the same way they were supposedly applied at Symantec. It seems to me that Symantec's claim is of lack of knowledge - that they contracted and trained CrossCert to do the right things, and the auditors said that they were, and they had no evidence that they were not, and so they assumed everything was fine. The question is whether that lack of knowledge amounts to negligence. Comments on this topic, with careful justification, are invited. [The alleged audit failures, as opposed to alleged failures by Symantec, will be discussed in a separate process.] Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

