On 08/03/2017 01:40, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 6:26 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:
On 07/03/2017 21:37, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
To make it simpler, wouldn't be a Policy Proposal be to prohibit Delegated
Third Parties from participating in the issuance process? This would be
effectively the same, in as much as the only capability to allow a
third-party to participate in issuance is to operate a subordinate CA.
I think it's procedurally identical to Policy Proposal 1, but it clarifies
more explicitly that RAs are forbidden, and that all participants in the
issuance ecosystem have a specific set of obligations.
The point is NOT to prohibit RAs (which are a good thing if done
right), but to allow revocation of certificates validated by a rogue RA.
The setup under policy 1 would be that the actual CA holds the key and
issuance systems in its own right and under its own security audits,
while the RA only deals with the actual verification steps (such as
checking that Foo Inc is actually incorporated in country X with
official address on Bar Avenue 123 in Baz City according to official
records in the local language).
Policy 1 is also intended for the reseller-RA combination seen in the
Symantec case, where the reseller-RA does other steps that could/should
be done by the CA directly (such as domain validation and suspicious
case double checking).
Policy 1 may still be a problem for the truly local RA scenario where a
large number of similar RAs handle in-person verification steps for a
small geographic area (such as schemes where each city hall handles
checking photo ID of applicants as part of validation at better
than EV level).
Jakob,
You basically restated what I said, except still kept the term "RA". Note
that my proposal would not have eliminated the conceptual role you're
describing - this is still facilitated - but it's explicitly called out as
an externally operated subordinate CA, with all the attendant
responsibility and audit criteria. The fact that one or more pieces of
infrastructure is offered by the issuing CA is nothing new, in practice,
and so the ecosystem already deals with (or fails to deal with) this case.
So perhaps it's useful if you can explain why "Delegated Third Party"
(since RA is overloaded to include the pre-validated domain case of an
Enteprise RA, as well as to cover the case where an RA does not perform
domain validation) is a useful concept to support, versus simply treating
it as the well-understood role of externally-operated subordinate CA?
I contradicted you in saying that RAs (or DTP as you now want to call
them) were not supposed to be banned by the policy change.
The point of a general-purpose RA (such as the ones that failed in the
Symantec case) is that they are supposed to explicitly perform fewer
functions and be subject to corresponding reduced requirements
(especially if properly setup from the CA end), and are to be audited
accordingly (without duplicated pseudo audit statements about the
nature of the CA hosted infrastructure).
Another type of true RA in the traditional sense is an office that
performs specific limited parts of the validation, with the main CA
doing the rest. For example the RA would check things that cannot be
checked from wherever the CA is located (in person identification,
access to local official records in local language etc.), while the CA
would do all the checks that don't depend on local knowledge, such as
domain checks, BR enforcement etc. These would be subject to even less
audit requirements compared to a subCA, since they perform an even more
limited subset of CA functions.
A type of Delegated Third Party that isn't an RA in the traditional
sense (but may fall under some RA definitions) would be a pre-validated
Enterprise authorized to request certificates for entities that are
fully nested under its validated name spaces (domains, distinguished
names), with the CA reusing (under the 39 month rule) validations of
those name spaces as being under full control of the enterprise. Those
enterprises could in fact be considered as being mere subscribers
rather than delegated third parties.
Except for the proposed new special policy (which serves only to
provide a centralized way for Mozilla to revoke all certificates issued
through a specific RA, and only in cases where the CA is somehow
unwilling to revoke those certificates itself while Mozilla is
unwilling to revoke the CA trust), there is nothing that
should conflate the DTP and CA roles.
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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