On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 8:08 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > > I contradicted you in saying that RAs (or DTP as you now want to call > them) were not supposed to be banned by the policy change. >
DTPs are the terms from the Baseline Requirements. All responsibilities and expectations are associated with that term. As to the statement "were not supposed to be banned by the policy change", I don't believe Gerv stated that, so it would be useful to understand why you've stated that. These were a variety of policy proposals - all of which are meant to change and/or clarify requirements - so I don't think we can state that simply removing the concept is off the table. As to the rest of your message, you describe what have historically been called RAs/DTPs. You have not, however, answered my question - which is what impact, if any, do you believe would happen if Mozilla considers the policy I suggested: That is, to require that anything which 'historically' was considered an RA be treated as an externally operated sub-CA. I assert that there remains functional equivalence in role and capabilities, but greater clarity as to expectations and audits. It would be useful if, for example, you could highlight how such a policy would create any form of new burden or requirement beyond the desired attributes - technical capability to revoke and greater assurance of compliance through public disclosure. Set aside the terminology question - and just focus on the practical impact, if any. Again, I assert, there is no negative impact, and any impact is the desired degree of clarification for which Delegated Third Parties are already nominally expected to be. As a practical matter regarding audits, there's no supporting evidence for the claim that RAs/Delegated Third Parties are allowed to be subject to less audit requirements than CAs. I'd be curious if you could provide any evidence in the Baseline Requirements or Mozilla Inclusion Policy to support this claim, since it would seem to me this is the crux of your objection. In short, I'm hoping you can help me understand * Why you believe it was not intended to 'eliminate' (though the functional role remains) Delegated Third Parties * Why you believe that Delegated Third Parties are subject to any less audit requirement than Externally-Operated Subordinate CAs You've stated what you believe, but I cannot find evidence to support either claim. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

