On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 8:08 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:
>
> I contradicted you in saying that RAs (or DTP as you now want to call
> them) were not supposed to be banned by the policy change.
>

DTPs are the terms from the Baseline Requirements. All responsibilities and
expectations are associated with that term.

As to the statement "were not supposed to be banned by the policy change",
I don't believe Gerv stated that, so it would be useful to understand why
you've stated that. These were a variety of policy proposals - all of which
are meant to change and/or clarify requirements - so I don't think we can
state that simply removing the concept is off the table.

As to the rest of your message, you describe what have historically been
called RAs/DTPs. You have not, however, answered my question - which is
what impact, if any, do you believe would happen if Mozilla considers the
policy I suggested: That is, to require that anything which 'historically'
was considered an RA be treated as an externally operated sub-CA.

I assert that there remains functional equivalence in role and
capabilities, but greater clarity as to expectations and audits. It would
be useful if, for example, you could highlight how such a policy would
create any form of new burden or requirement beyond the desired attributes
- technical capability to revoke and greater assurance of compliance
through public disclosure. Set aside the terminology question - and just
focus on the practical impact, if any.

Again, I assert, there is no negative impact, and any impact is the desired
degree of clarification for which Delegated Third Parties are already
nominally expected to be.

As a practical matter regarding audits, there's no supporting evidence for
the claim that RAs/Delegated Third Parties are allowed to be subject to
less audit requirements than CAs. I'd be curious if you could provide any
evidence in the Baseline Requirements or Mozilla Inclusion Policy to
support this claim, since it would seem to me this is the crux of your
objection.

In short, I'm hoping you can help me understand
* Why you believe it was not intended to 'eliminate' (though the functional
role remains) Delegated Third Parties
* Why you believe that Delegated Third Parties are subject to any less
audit requirement than Externally-Operated Subordinate CAs

You've stated what you believe, but I cannot find evidence to support
either claim.
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