On 08/03/2017 04:21, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 8:08 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

I contradicted you in saying that RAs (or DTP as you now want to call
them) were not supposed to be banned by the policy change.


DTPs are the terms from the Baseline Requirements. All responsibilities and
expectations are associated with that term.

As to the statement "were not supposed to be banned by the policy change",
I don't believe Gerv stated that, so it would be useful to understand why
you've stated that. These were a variety of policy proposals - all of which
are meant to change and/or clarify requirements - so I don't think we can
state that simply removing the concept is off the table.


I saw nothing in Gervs posting suggesting that banning all kinds of
RA/DTP relationships was the intended effect.

As to the rest of your message, you describe what have historically been
called RAs/DTPs. You have not, however, answered my question - which is
what impact, if any, do you believe would happen if Mozilla considers the
policy I suggested: That is, to require that anything which 'historically'
was considered an RA be treated as an externally operated sub-CA.

For the kind of RA that is a combined reseller/control everything
related to issuing (the Symantec case), there would be no significant
change in burden for the RA.

For the kind of RA that only does specific relevant parts of validation
(a "traditional" RA), the suggested policy as written would "simply"
require the CA to set up and maintain one (set of) subCAs for each of
their RAs, while your rephrasing as a ban on RA/DTP relationships would
impose the full cost of a formal WebTrust (etc.) audit on RAs that only
perform a specific limited function that could be audited much cheaper,
provided the CA systems were set up to have little dependency on
certificate specific activities and security at the RAs.

For example, an RA whose sole involvement is to receive a daily list of
company name/idno/address/authorized signatory for pending
applications, go down to the state hall of records and report back
which ones match/do not match official company records (to support EV
certification for that state) would only need auditing of that activity
and the security of the system used to exchange that list and report
with the CAs central validation team.  They should not need to pay a
local WebTrust auditor to certify that the many activities done
centrally at the CA (in a different country altogether) meet any
particular requirements, as that should be in scope only for the actual
auditing of the central CA (which should include auditing of the
presence and compliance of the RA audit reports).

For the "Enterprise customer" "DTP" case, I think subjecting each
Enterprise that has a "cheaply issue certs for subnames" account to any
kind of special audit would be as mindbogglingly onerous as requiring
every shop that accepts credit cards via a 3rd party such as Google to
go through and comply with full PCI certification for systems that
never see credit card numbers, only the shopping cart.

For this case, the only thing that needs auditing is that the CA itself
has properly validated that the Enterprise customer has the full
authority to decide and state which of the acceptable subnames are who
they say they are (as per DNS zone delegations for DNSnames, per mail
domain ownership as per e-mail names etc.).  In other words the only
thing the Enterprise customer is delegated to validate is those things
for which the Enterprise customer is the ultimate authority anyway.



I assert that there remains functional equivalence in role and
capabilities, but greater clarity as to expectations and audits. It would
be useful if, for example, you could highlight how such a policy would
create any form of new burden or requirement beyond the desired attributes
- technical capability to revoke and greater assurance of compliance
through public disclosure. Set aside the terminology question - and just
focus on the practical impact, if any.

Again, I assert, there is no negative impact, and any impact is the desired
degree of clarification for which Delegated Third Parties are already
nominally expected to be.

As a practical matter regarding audits, there's no supporting evidence for
the claim that RAs/Delegated Third Parties are allowed to be subject to
less audit requirements than CAs. I'd be curious if you could provide any
evidence in the Baseline Requirements or Mozilla Inclusion Policy to
support this claim, since it would seem to me this is the crux of your
objection.

In short, I'm hoping you can help me understand
* Why you believe it was not intended to 'eliminate' (though the functional
role remains) Delegated Third Parties
* Why you believe that Delegated Third Parties are subject to any less
audit requirement than Externally-Operated Subordinate CAs

You've stated what you believe, but I cannot find evidence to support
either claim.



Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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