On 07/03/2017 21:37, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 6:37 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:
Policy Proposal 1: require all CAs to arrange it so that certs validated
by an RA are issued from one or more intermediates dedicated solely to
that RA, with such intermediates clearly labelled with the name of the
RA in the Subject.
If we enact Policy Proposal 1, that allows RAs to be cut off, and also
provides a natural point for the CP/CPS and audits of the RA to be
monitored in the CCADB, because they would be attached by the CA to the
issuing intermediate for that RA.
Symantec's oversight of their RAs was clearly inadequate; various forms
of misissuance were not detected.
To make it simpler, wouldn't be a Policy Proposal be to prohibit Delegated
Third Parties from participating in the issuance process? This would be
effectively the same, in as much as the only capability to allow a
third-party to participate in issuance is to operate a subordinate CA.
I think it's procedurally identical to Policy Proposal 1, but it clarifies
more explicitly that RAs are forbidden, and that all participants in the
issuance ecosystem have a specific set of obligations.
The point is NOT to prohibit RAs (which are a good thing if done
right), but to allow revocation of certificates validated by a rogue RA.
The setup under policy 1 would be that the actual CA holds the key and
issuance systems in its own right and under its own security audits,
while the RA only deals with the actual verification steps (such as
checking that Foo Inc is actually incorporated in country X with
official address on Bar Avenue 123 in Baz City according to official
records in the local language).
Policy 1 is also intended for the reseller-RA combination seen in the
Symantec case, where the reseller-RA does other steps that could/should
be done by the CA directly (such as domain validation and suspicious
case double checking).
Policy 1 may still be a problem for the truly local RA scenario where a
large number of similar RAs handle in-person verification steps for a
small geographic area (such as schemes where each city hall handles
checking photo ID of applicants as part of validation at better
than EV level).
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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