Well, you still said the same thing, and I understood what you said, but not why you said it or why you believe it. That's why I was asking for new details.
Certificate Policy OIDs don't say who the certificate belongs to or who issued the certificate. They describe the policies relative to how the certificate was issued and validated. This is much clearer if you read the relevant ETSI TS/EN series of docs related to Certificate Policies. To your point about identifying the issuer, I may be misunderstanding your point, but it sounds like you're just confused about how browsers work. Browsers don't look up the EV OID to determine who the issuer is, so if you're concerned that would present a problem, it doesn't. Instead, browsers look for *any* EV enabled OID in the leaf certificate, then attempt to build/verify that a chain can be built to one or more root certificates "enabled" for that OID. If they can, the leaf is called EV, and the browser determines who issued it by looking at the root. So if Symantec were to issue such a certificate using GlobalSign's EV OID, and Symantec's root was enabled for that OID, and it validated according to RFC5280 for that OID, then the certificate would appear as a Symantec-issued (because Symantec root) EV cert. Of course, I have oversimplified this for you - the actual UI browsers tend to take is not from the root, but from the issuing intermediate, or metadata external to the root, so it's also not an issue for the root to say Symantec, ValiCert, Equifax, Norton, or something else - because that's ignored when better data is available, and it always is, if the CA is responsive to root program requirements. On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 10:31 PM Richard Wang <[email protected]> wrote: > Maybe I don’t say it clearly. > > > > The EV SSL have two policy OID, one is the CABF EV OID, another one is the > CA's EV OID, right? > > Check the EV SSL for www.symantec.com, the CABF EV OID is 2.23.140.1.1, > and the Symantec EV OID is 2.16.840.1.113733.1.7.23.6 > > And check www.gloabalsign.com EV SSL that no CABF EV OID, GlobalSign EV > OID is 1.3.6.1.4.1.4146.1.1 > > > > What I mean is the GlobalSign EV OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.4146.1.1 is belong to > GlobalSign that the browser can identity the EV SSL Issuer is GlobalSign, > so Google can’t use this EV OID for its own EV SSL, Google must use its own > EV OID for its EV SSL. > > > > So, no EV OID transfer issue for root key transfer. > > > > > > Best Regards, > > > > Richard > > > > *From:* Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Thursday, March 9, 2017 11:14 AM > *To:* Gervase Markham <[email protected]>; Richard Wang <[email protected]>; > [email protected] > > > *Subject:* Re: Google Trust Services roots > > > > Hi Richard, > > > > That's not how Certificate Policy OIDs work - either in the specifications > or in the Baseline Requirements. I'm also not aware of any program > requiring what you describe. > > > > Because of this, it's unclear to me, and I suspect many other readers, why > you believe this is the case, or if you meant that it SHOULD be the case > (for example, developing a new policy requirement), why you believe this. > > > > Perhaps you could share more details about your reasoning? > > > > On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 9:15 PM Richard Wang via dev-security-policy < > [email protected]> wrote: > > As I understand, the EV SSL have two policy OID, one is the CABF EV OID, > another one is the CA's EV OID, so the root key transfer doesn't have the > EV OID transfer case, CA can't transfer its own EV OID to other CA > exception the CA is full acquired. > > So the policy can make clear that the root key transfer can't transfer the > EV OID, the receiver must use its own EV policy OID for its EV SSL, the > receiver can't use the transferor's EV OID. > > Best Regards, > > Richard > > -----Original Message----- > From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard= > [email protected]] On Behalf Of Gervase Markham via > dev-security-policy > Sent: Thursday, March 9, 2017 12:21 AM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: Google Trust Services roots > > Having gained a good understanding of Peter and Ryan's positions, I think > I am now in a position to evaluate Peter's helpful policy suggestions. > > Whether or not we decide to make updates, as Kathleen pronounced herself > satisfied at the time with Google's presented documentation and migration > plan, it would be unreasonable for us to retroactively censure Google for > following that plan. > > On 09/02/17 22:55, Peter Bowen wrote: > > Policy Suggestion A) When transferring a root that is EV enabled, it > > should be clearly stated whether the recipient of the root is also > > receiving the EV policy OID(s). > > I agree with this suggestion; we should update > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy , and eventually > incorporate it into the main policy when we fix > https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/57 . > > > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

