I don’t think so, please check this page: https://cabforum.org/object-registry/ 
that listed most CA’s EV OID, and all browsers ask for the CA’s own EV OID when 
applying inclusion and EV enabled. So, as I understand that the browser display 
EV green bar and display the “Identified by CA name” is based on this CA’s EV 
OID.



I don’t think Symantec have the reason to use GlobalSign EV OID in its EV SSL 
certificate, why Symantec don’t use his own EV OID? If Symantec issued a EV SSL 
using GlobalSign's EV OID, I think IE browser will display this EV SSL is 
identified by GlobalSign, not by Symantec.





Best Regards,



Richard



From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, March 9, 2017 12:21 PM
To: Gervase Markham <[email protected]>; Richard Wang <[email protected]>; Ryan 
Sleevi <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Subject: Re: Google Trust Services roots



Well, you still said the same thing, and I understood what you said, but not 
why you said it or why you believe it. That's why I was asking for new details.



Certificate Policy OIDs don't say who the certificate belongs to or who issued 
the certificate. They describe the policies relative to how the certificate was 
issued and validated. This is much clearer if you read the relevant ETSI TS/EN 
series of docs related to Certificate Policies.



To your point about identifying the issuer, I may be misunderstanding your 
point, but it sounds like you're just confused about how browsers work. 
Browsers don't look up the EV OID to determine who the issuer is, so if you're 
concerned that would present a problem, it doesn't.



Instead, browsers look for *any* EV enabled OID in the leaf certificate, then 
attempt to build/verify that a chain can be built to one or more root 
certificates "enabled" for that OID. If they can, the leaf is called EV, and 
the browser determines who issued it by looking at the root.



So if Symantec were to issue such a certificate using GlobalSign's EV OID, and 
Symantec's root was enabled for that OID, and it validated according to RFC5280 
for that OID, then the certificate would appear as a Symantec-issued (because 
Symantec root) EV cert.



Of course, I have oversimplified this for you - the actual UI browsers tend to 
take is not from the root, but from the issuing intermediate, or metadata 
external to the root, so it's also not an issue for the root to say Symantec, 
ValiCert, Equifax, Norton, or something else - because that's ignored when 
better data is available, and it always is, if the CA is responsive to root 
program requirements.





On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 10:31 PM Richard Wang 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

   Maybe I don’t say it clearly.



   The EV SSL have two policy OID, one is the CABF EV OID, another one is the 
CA's EV OID, right?

   Check the EV SSL for www.symantec.com<http://www.symantec.com>, the CABF EV 
OID is 2.23.140.1.1, and the Symantec EV OID is 2.16.840.1.113733.1.7.23.6

   And check www.gloabalsign.com<http://www.gloabalsign.com> EV SSL that no 
CABF EV OID, GlobalSign EV OID is 1.3.6.1.4.1.4146.1.1



   What I mean is the GlobalSign EV OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.4146.1.1 is belong to 
GlobalSign that the browser can identity the EV SSL Issuer is GlobalSign, so 
Google can’t use this EV OID for its own EV SSL, Google must use its own EV OID 
for its EV SSL.



   So, no EV OID transfer issue for root key transfer.





   Best Regards,



   Richard



   From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>]
   Sent: Thursday, March 9, 2017 11:14 AM
   To: Gervase Markham <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Richard 
Wang <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>


   Subject: Re: Google Trust Services roots



   Hi Richard,



   That's not how Certificate Policy OIDs work - either in the specifications 
or in the Baseline Requirements. I'm also not aware of any program requiring 
what you describe.



   Because of this, it's unclear to me, and I suspect many other readers, why 
you believe this is the case, or if you meant that it SHOULD be the case (for 
example, developing a new policy requirement), why you believe this.



   Perhaps you could share more details about your reasoning?



   On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 9:15 PM Richard Wang via dev-security-policy 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
 wrote:

      As I understand, the EV SSL have two policy OID, one is the CABF EV OID, 
another one is the CA's EV OID, so the root key transfer doesn't have the EV 
OID transfer case, CA can't transfer its own EV OID to other CA exception the 
CA is full acquired.

      So the policy can make clear that the root key transfer can't transfer 
the EV OID, the receiver must use its own EV policy OID for its EV SSL, the 
receiver can't use the transferor's EV OID.

      Best Regards,

      Richard

      -----Original Message-----
      From: dev-security-policy 
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard<mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces%2Brichard>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>]
 On Behalf Of Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
      Sent: Thursday, March 9, 2017 12:21 AM
      To: 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
      Subject: Re: Google Trust Services roots

      Having gained a good understanding of Peter and Ryan's positions, I think 
I am now in a position to evaluate Peter's helpful policy suggestions.

      Whether or not we decide to make updates, as Kathleen pronounced herself 
satisfied at the time with Google's presented documentation and migration plan, 
it would be unreasonable for us to retroactively censure Google for following 
that plan.

      On 09/02/17 22:55, Peter Bowen wrote:
      > Policy Suggestion A) When transferring a root that is EV enabled, it
      > should be clearly stated whether the recipient of the root is also
      > receiving the EV policy OID(s).

      I agree with this suggestion; we should update 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy , and eventually incorporate it 
into the main policy when we fix
      https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/57 .


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