On 25/04/2017 05:04, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 9:42 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

On 25/04/2017 03:10, Peter Kurrasch wrote:

Fair enough. I propose the following for consideration:

Prior to ‎transferring ownership of a root cert contained in the trusted
store (either on an individual root basis or as part of a company
acquisition), a public attestation must be given as to the intended
management of the root upon completion of the transfer. "Intention" must
be one of the following:

A) The purchaser has been in compliance with Mozilla policies for more
than 12 months and will continue to administer (operate? manage?) the
root in accordance with those policies.

B) The purchaser has not been in compliance with Mozilla policies for
more than 12 months but will ‎do so before the transfer takes place. The
purchaser will then continue to administer/operate/manage the root in
accordance with Mozilla policies.

How about:

B2) The purchaser is not part of the Mozilla root program and has not
been so in the recent past, but intends to continue the program
membership held by the seller.  The purchaser intends to complete
approval negotiations with the Mozilla root program before the transfer
takes place.  The purchaser intends to retain most of the expertise,
personnel, equipment etc. involved in the operation of the CA, as will
be detailed during such negotiations.

This, or some other wording, would be for a complete purchase of the
business rather than a merge into an existing CA, similar to what
happened when Symantec purchased Verisign's original CA business years
ago, or (on a much smaller scale) when Nets purchased the TDC's CA
business unit and renamed it as DanID.


Why is that desirable? If anything, such acquisitions seem to be more
harmful than helpful to the CA ecosystem. That is, why _wouldn't_ a merge
be useful/desirable? What problems are you attempting to solve?


Look at my two examples of past acquisitions.  As far as I remember, in
neither case was the purchasing security company previously a trusted
CA, and they took over practically the whole operation with no initial
changes besides a name change.

Another variant of this scenario is when a CA restructures its formal
ownership structure, such as inserting or removing one or more levels
of companies between the ultimate owners and the CA operations
activity.  In many cases this would technically be an acquisition by a
new company that isn't a CA itself (as the acquiring company would
often be an empty shell).  One example would be the recent creation of
GTS from part of Google Inc, since GTS was a new company with no past
CA activity, while the acquired Google division had a past as a SubCA
and a recently acquired root cert.


Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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