Hi Cory,

On 11/05/17 15:21, Cory Benfield wrote:
> While I’m very supportive of this kind of remediation, it is not a 
> remediation that non-browser implementations can follow very easily. 

Unfortunately, this is not a good enough reason to remove graduate trust
proposals from our arsenal of possible remedies for issues. Because if
the choice is only "trust everything" or "do not trust anything" from a
particular root, we have no mitigations for the Too Big To Fail problem.

> If Mozilla is interested in doing a substantial public service, this 
> situation could be improved by having Mozilla and MDSP define a static 
> configuration format that expresses the graduated trust rules as data, not 
> code. 

The trouble with this is that the vocabulary of such a format is almost
unbounded. It effectively has to be code, rather than data, because we
could in the future make any number of rules about certificates based on
any number of criteria.

So we decided to use English instead, which is why this exists:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Additional_Trust_Changes

Gerv

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