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On 05/16/2017 11:10 AM, Peter Bowen wrote:
> Jakob,
>
> What I think Ryan has been trying to express is his view that this
> request is not possible. A *stable* data format is unable to
> express future graduated trust rules.
>
I've been thinking on this and I'm starting to question this. The fact
of the matter is most of the graduated trust scenarios involve a
whitelist/blacklist, or putting restraints on the values of fields on
a certificate. If you simply have a way to express requirements for
ASN1 fields and such, that handles lot of the simple cases. For
example, wosign would need the following constraints:
"CN=Certification Authority of WoSign, OU=null, O=WoSign CA Limited, C=C
N"
blacklist-leafs:
- NotBefore: > 2016-21-10
- Attributes: inclusive
For the case of ANSSI, it would look something like this
*ANSSI Distinished Name*
- blacklist-leafs
- whitelist-leafs:
- CommonName:
- ends-in .fr
- ends-in .gp
- ends-in .gf
- ends-in .mq
- ends-in .re
etc.
For knocking out the future certificates, and that this blacklist
should apply if this certificate appears anywhere in the chain of trust.
While that won't handle every single case, being able to specify that
a field must be present, or have this valid (or not have this valid)
in an extensiable way would handle a fair number of cases for
graduated trust.
Granted, it won't handle everything, but it's not let perfect be the
enemy of good here. Right now, if you naively imported the Mozilla
root store, you get a number of certificates you probably shouldn't be
trusting.
In the case we need to specify a new type of trust restrictions, then
we extend the format, and implement it. It's up to downstream authors
to actually parse the data and do something with it. If the graduated
trust data is in a standardized format, there's a decent chance other
libraries may be willing to support it.
If someone can prove me wrong and show a case where Mozilla proposed
or implemented graduated trust that couldn't be expressed as a
combination of a whitelist/blacklist, and attribute comparsions, I'd
very much like to know if it.
Michael
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