> On 11 May 2017, at 20:20, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> In contrast to the idea of trying to get other clients to implement all the 
> nuances of Firefox's graduated trust, my idea here is to promote the option 
> of deliberately distrusting CAs entirely in these clients, ahead of any such 
> extreme sanction from Mozilla in Firefox. Mozilla could decide (or not) to 
> add an advisory mark when putting in place a graduated trust and this would 
> mean the maintenance burden to offer both an ordinary and a "no-compromise" 
> trust store with something like Requests would be minimal, just 
> verify=certifi.I_HATE_FUN or whatever.

I try not to decide whether there is interest in features like this: if they’re 
easy I’d just implement them and let users decide if they want it. That’s what 
I’d be inclined to do here. If Mozilla added such a flag, I’d definitely be 
open to adding an extra certifi bundle. Certifi currently already ships with 
two bundles (one labelled “weak”, which includes 1024-bit roots to work around 
problems with older OpenSSLs), so we could easily add a third called “strong” 
or “pedantic” or “I hate CAs” or something that removes any CA that is subject 
to graduated trust in Firefox.

So, yeah, if Mozilla was interested in adding such a flag, I’d be interested in 
using it to build alternative trust stores.

Cory

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