I think you left this a bit implicit Cory, so I figured it's worth spelling
out: the strength of Mozilla's CA program, as a tool for making the web
stronger, comes from having people using it, that's the carrot that forces
people to meet our standards (also the fact that as a transparent, root
program, we serve as a model for the industry!). If we can get better at
including the non-browser clients, who are already using the "raw" trust
store, it only strengthens our ability to secure the web -- I think we can
all agree that's a good goal :-)

As you point out though, a huge challenge, is that historically CA-specific
remediations have been unique to the circumstances, which means any
remediaton we invent a syntax for may be used only once, and any new CA
misbehavior may necessitate a remediation we don't have a syntax for yet.

I'm not smart enough to come up with a solution for this, other than that
maybe if we repeat the process enough times, we'll eventually standardize
on a small set of core remediations -- hopefully we never get there though
:-)

Alex

On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 2:30 PM, Cory Benfield <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> > On 11 May 2017, at 19:27, Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > On 11/05/17 18:05, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> >> I don't think Cory's arguing against browsers making use of these types
> of
> >> remediations, he just wants the non-browser clients to be able to
> >> participate as well :-)
> >
> > Sure. I'm just heading off that argument at the pass :-)
>
> Yeah, Alex is right. I’m *extremely* supportive of the graduated trust
> proposals: indeed, I think MDSP’s behaviour and remedies have been
> exemplary. I was just feeling out the possibility of Mozilla turning into a
> force multiplier.
>
> Cory
_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to