I think you left this a bit implicit Cory, so I figured it's worth spelling out: the strength of Mozilla's CA program, as a tool for making the web stronger, comes from having people using it, that's the carrot that forces people to meet our standards (also the fact that as a transparent, root program, we serve as a model for the industry!). If we can get better at including the non-browser clients, who are already using the "raw" trust store, it only strengthens our ability to secure the web -- I think we can all agree that's a good goal :-)
As you point out though, a huge challenge, is that historically CA-specific remediations have been unique to the circumstances, which means any remediaton we invent a syntax for may be used only once, and any new CA misbehavior may necessitate a remediation we don't have a syntax for yet. I'm not smart enough to come up with a solution for this, other than that maybe if we repeat the process enough times, we'll eventually standardize on a small set of core remediations -- hopefully we never get there though :-) Alex On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 2:30 PM, Cory Benfield <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 11 May 2017, at 19:27, Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 11/05/17 18:05, Alex Gaynor wrote: > >> I don't think Cory's arguing against browsers making use of these types > of > >> remediations, he just wants the non-browser clients to be able to > >> participate as well :-) > > > > Sure. I'm just heading off that argument at the pass :-) > > Yeah, Alex is right. I’m *extremely* supportive of the graduated trust > proposals: indeed, I think MDSP’s behaviour and remedies have been > exemplary. I was just feeling out the possibility of Mozilla turning into a > force multiplier. > > Cory _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

