A few comments: Am Freitag, 21. Dezember 2012, 00:31:25 schrieb Matthew Toseland: > - Pad the small keys to be the same size as big keys, since there are likely > mostly big keys. > - Pad the keys with extra redundancy until you get to a standard number of > keys. This will be some standard formula like 1-7 * a power of 2. > - Use K and X to derive K_n and X_n for each block.
→ anonymize the keys? > into their pre-insert cache, including X_n. Why a special cache? Why not normal insert? > The first node on the chain which has the pre-insert in its pre-insert cache > decrypts the block and does a normal insert. I see an attack here: I insert many chunks which go to the same part of the keyspace. When I send the reveal, I can start a distributed replacement attack. Any chance to avoid that? > chain are still connected it will prove to them that the insert has been How do they prove it? > There are various increasingly complex solutions to starting the reveal > somewhere other than the originator. If we do #1 above, we can exploit the > fact that MassReveal is just K, X, and n (the number of blocks), i.e. it is > tiny. However, even if we do #2 above, it's still small - just maybe not > small enough for Dining Cryptographers. Oh, that’s the how. Nice! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem Best wishes, Arne
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
_______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [email protected] https://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
