Tero, you illuminate an important issue, but you confuse the boundary
between the filtering system admin and the individual user.

To effectively filter forwarded mail, the filtering system needs to know
whether the forwarding path has been requested or not.   This applies
whether the forwarder is a mailing list or a redirected user account.

GoogleGroups and Outlook groups are routinely used to create mailing lists
to which no one has ever subscribed.   That allows the attacker to use
these services as if they were open relays.  DKIM reply is only possible
because filtering systems do not know whether a forward is subscribed, and
therefore legitimate, or not.   Therefore, any filtering system that
accepts forwards SHOULD have administrative controls in place to determine
if a forwarding path is acceptable.   For redirected user accounts, the
forwarding system admin should also be involved to review whether the
forward is compliant with local policy and correctly configured to an
account that actually wants the mail stream.   Strangely, the environments
that receive the most forwarded traffic seem to have the least interest
toward establishing those controls.  ARC cannot fix ignorance or user
preferences.

Sometimes, forwarded traffic is hard to detect.  If ARC is present, it
should help to distinguish between traffic handled by a forwarder and
traffic handled by an outbound gateway service.

As long as the filtering system is ignorant of user preferences, it does
not matter that the user knows which forwarded mail streams are legitimate.

Doug Foster



On Mon, Apr 27, 2026 at 3:13 PM Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote:

> Murray S. Kucherawy writes:
> > On Thu, Apr 23, 2026 at 8:04 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >
> >     Section 3.1 states that "ARC required evaluators to run a reputation
> >     system for ARC signers."  This is not accurate.  The only occurrence
> of
> >     the term "reputation" in the ARC specification is in Section 7.1.2,
> where
> >     it notes that a site /may/ apply reputation-based filtering.  There
> is no
> >     requirement for evaluators to operate such a system.
> >
> > I would assume what's meant here is that ARC is only truly valuable if
> you
> > develop some kind of reputation for "good" or "bad" actors in the ARC
> chain.
> > Without that, ARC's value is arguably limited.  (The same argument
> applies to
> > DKIM.)
>
> Which wrong. Forwarding does not happen without the recipient knowing
> it, thus recipient will KNOW which email serverices are forwarding
> emails to him (he has set those forwarding himself). If he has set up
> the forwardings himself, he clearly already trustes the service as he
> trusts that service to process his emails, thus he can trust the ARC
> headers generated by that service.
>
> There is no need for any kind of global trust, only per recipient
> trust and that is easy for him to configure to his recipient system.
>
> >     More generally, the use of signatures should be considered within a
> >     broader authentication and authorization framework.  Internet email
> has
> >     historically operated without mandatory authentication, and with an
> >     implicit authorization model in which any sender can attempt
> delivery to
> >     any recipient without prior arrangement.  This openness is a core
> property
> >     of the system.  Forwarding, by contrast, introduces third-party
> assertions
> >     of identity, where this implicit authorization model no longer
> applies
> >     cleanly.
> >
> > If I configure this email address to forward elsewhere, does Gmail make
> any
> > assertions about any identity in the message (apart from, say, its own
> DKIM
> > signature)?  I don't think that's ever true, much less generally true.
>
> But when you set up the forwarding that means you do trust google. So
> your final destination can be configure it to trust ARC headers
> generated by the google, as you know that you are going to be
> receiving forwarded emails from google, and as you clearly trust it,
> you can trust its ARC headers, and if they say that SPF/DKIM/DMARC
> passed when it came in, you know that was true at that point.
> --
> [email protected]
>
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