On Sun, May 10, 2026 at 7:37 AM Douglas Foster < [email protected]> wrote:
> The core issue is that email provides communication that is unsolicited, > nearly free, universal, and amenable to automation. Nobody actually wants > that, because nobody wants to communicate with everybody, and nobody has > enough time to communicate with everybody. There are 8 billion people in > the world, and most of us communicate in multiple roles as individuals, and > as part of organizations where we work or volunteer. So we have maybe 50 > billion legitimate identities for communication. It will take only a tiny > subset of that 50 billion to become a denial of service attack on my > mailbox or on my organization's mail infrastructure. The success of > Facebook is that it provides a way to control who is allowed to communicate > with you. Phone service became a lot less useful when long distance > calling and international calling became free or inexpensive. > > So, the purpose of email filtering is to find the tiny subset of > acceptable senders from the nearly infinite universe of possible senders. > The fact that some of those senders are malicious is relevant, but only > part of the problem. Until I blocked them, 10% of our incoming mail was > from a single ESP advertising for legitimate companies. > > To solve the spam problem, email has to move from allow-by-default to > quarantine-by-default. We allow or block mail streams, and a mail stream > is defined by the origination process and the transmit flow. That has a > lot of complexity, so we try to simplify by focusing on the things we know > about the delivering server and the message state at delivery. This is an > imperfect strategy. Bottom line is that I like ARC because it provides a > little bit of useful information about how a message arrived, and that will > be useful in some contexts. > > Doug > > > On Sat, May 9, 2026 at 9:53 PM Murray S. Kucherawy <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Mon, Apr 27, 2026 at 12:13 PM Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> > I would assume what's meant here is that ARC is only truly valuable if >>> you >>> > develop some kind of reputation for "good" or "bad" actors in the ARC >>> chain. >>> > Without that, ARC's value is arguably limited. (The same argument >>> applies to >>> > DKIM.) >>> >>> Which wrong. Forwarding does not happen without the recipient knowing >>> it, thus recipient will KNOW which email serverices are forwarding >>> emails to him (he has set those forwarding himself). If he has set up >>> the forwardings himself, he clearly already trustes the service as he >>> trusts that service to process his emails, thus he can trust the ARC >>> headers generated by that service. >>> >>> There is no need for any kind of global trust, only per recipient >>> trust and that is easy for him to configure to his recipient system. >> >> >> This presumes a trust relationship between the operator and the user. It >> amounts to saying that if I tell GMail I'm forwarding mail to this mailbox >> from elsewhere, GMail must trust the source I name. But why should they >> trust that I'm acting in good faith and possibly expose themselves to abuse? >> >> Also, any trust framework requiring the user to set something up >> correctly and remember to tear it down later adds technical complexity we >> may not want, frustrating users who will balk at the resulting user >> experience. >> >> > If I configure this email address to forward elsewhere, does Gmail make >>> any >>> > assertions about any identity in the message (apart from, say, its own >>> DKIM >>> > signature)? I don't think that's ever true, much less generally true. >>> >>> But when you set up the forwarding that means you do trust google. >> >> >> I, personally, might. But there's no reason for the two operators to >> trust each other just because I said so. >> >> -MSK >> >> While these discussions are interesting, I have to wonder how they fit within the working group recharter and adoption of Trent's draft. I thought the scope of discussion is supposed to be limited to whether ARC should be deprecated. "Discussion creep" was exactly the reason I was against the recharter in the first place. Chairs? Michael Hammer
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