On Sun, May 10, 2026 at 7:37 AM Douglas Foster <
[email protected]> wrote:

> The core issue is that email provides communication that is unsolicited,
> nearly free, universal, and amenable to automation.   Nobody actually wants
> that, because nobody wants to communicate with everybody, and nobody has
> enough time to communicate with everybody.  There are 8 billion people in
> the world, and most of us communicate in multiple roles as individuals, and
> as part of organizations where we work or volunteer.    So we have maybe 50
> billion legitimate identities for communication.  It will take only a tiny
> subset of that 50 billion to become a denial of service attack on my
> mailbox or on my organization's mail infrastructure.  The success of
> Facebook is that it provides a way to control who is allowed to communicate
> with you.   Phone service became a lot less useful when long distance
> calling and international calling became free or inexpensive.
>
> So, the purpose of email filtering is to find the tiny subset of
> acceptable senders from the nearly infinite universe of possible senders.
>  The fact that some of those senders are malicious is relevant, but only
> part of the problem.   Until I blocked them, 10% of our incoming mail was
> from a single ESP advertising for legitimate companies.
>
> To solve the spam problem, email has to move from allow-by-default to
> quarantine-by-default.   We allow or block mail streams, and a mail stream
> is defined by the origination process and the transmit flow.    That has a
> lot of complexity, so we try to simplify by focusing on the things we know
> about the delivering server and the message state at delivery.   This is an
> imperfect strategy.  Bottom line is that I like ARC because it provides a
> little bit of useful information about how a message arrived, and that will
> be useful in some contexts.
>
> Doug
>
>
> On Sat, May 9, 2026 at 9:53 PM Murray S. Kucherawy <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Apr 27, 2026 at 12:13 PM Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> > I would assume what's meant here is that ARC is only truly valuable if
>>> you
>>> > develop some kind of reputation for "good" or "bad" actors in the ARC
>>> chain.
>>> > Without that, ARC's value is arguably limited.  (The same argument
>>> applies to
>>> > DKIM.)
>>>
>>> Which wrong. Forwarding does not happen without the recipient knowing
>>> it, thus recipient will KNOW which email serverices are forwarding
>>> emails to him (he has set those forwarding himself). If he has set up
>>> the forwardings himself, he clearly already trustes the service as he
>>> trusts that service to process his emails, thus he can trust the ARC
>>> headers generated by that service.
>>>
>>> There is no need for any kind of global trust, only per recipient
>>> trust and that is easy for him to configure to his recipient system.
>>
>>
>> This presumes a trust relationship between the operator and the user.  It
>> amounts to saying that if I tell GMail I'm forwarding mail to this mailbox
>> from elsewhere, GMail must trust the source I name.  But why should they
>> trust that I'm acting in good faith and possibly expose themselves to abuse?
>>
>> Also, any trust framework requiring the user to set something up
>> correctly and remember to tear it down later adds technical complexity we
>> may not want, frustrating users who will balk at the resulting user
>> experience.
>>
>> > If I configure this email address to forward elsewhere, does Gmail make
>>> any
>>> > assertions about any identity in the message (apart from, say, its own
>>> DKIM
>>> > signature)?  I don't think that's ever true, much less generally true.
>>>
>>> But when you set up the forwarding that means you do trust google.
>>
>>
>> I, personally, might.  But there's no reason for the two operators to
>> trust each other just because I said so.
>>
>> -MSK
>>
>>
While these discussions are interesting, I have to wonder how they fit
within the working group recharter and adoption of Trent's draft. I thought
the scope of discussion is supposed to be limited to whether ARC should be
deprecated. "Discussion creep" was exactly the reason I was against the
recharter in the first place. Chairs?

Michael Hammer
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