Murray S. Kucherawy writes:
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2026 at 12:13 PM Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote:
>     Which wrong. Forwarding does not happen without the recipient knowing
>     it, thus recipient will KNOW which email serverices are forwarding
>     emails to him (he has set those forwarding himself). If he has set up
>     the forwardings himself, he clearly already trustes the service as he
>     trusts that service to process his emails, thus he can trust the ARC
>     headers generated by that service.
>    
>     There is no need for any kind of global trust, only per recipient
>     trust and that is easy for him to configure to his recipient system.
> 
> This presumes a trust relationship between the operator and the user.  It
> amounts to saying that if I tell GMail I'm forwarding mail to this mailbox
> from elsewhere, GMail must trust the source I name.  But why should they trust
> that I'm acting in good faith and possibly expose themselves to abuse?

If someone is an customer/user in the system there is trust
relationship with the customer/user and the system. I.e., if I am
paying system X for them to provide me mailbox services, I do assume
they actually do want to provide that service, and if I am telling
them that there is service Y that will be forwarding emails to me, and
system X should trust that service Y ARC headers while processing
emails for ME. System X does not open them for abuse, they open the
user to be able to receive emails meant for them. If the user adds
random hosts for his trustedforwarder list, then it is only the user
who is opening himself up to the abuse, as that trustedforwarder list
of that user does not affect any other users in the system X.

On the otherhand you are never customer/user of the google, you are
just product they are selling out, so they do not care whethter your
emails gets through or not.

> Also, any trust framework requiring the user to set something up
> correctly and remember to tear it down later adds technical
> complexity we may not want, frustrating users who will balk at the
> resulting user experience.

Any forwarding does require users to set up something anyways, I do
not see any difference why we only need to set up things on service Y,
but not on service X when I set system Y to forward emails to service
X for me.

If the user stops using service Y and forgets to remove service Y from
the trustedforwarder list in service X for himself, he will notice
that himself, as he is the only person affected by this, thus if it
starts to get annoying he will then remember to remove that entry from
the list.

Also valid ARC header does not mean that email is automatically
accepted, it just means that your email filtering system for you can
use that information in addition to the latest SPF/DKIM/DMARC
information available to the end system. 

> 
>     > If I configure this email address to forward elsewhere, does
>     > Gmail make any assertions about any identity in the message
>     > (apart from, say, its own DKIM signature)?  I don't think
>     > that's ever true, much less generally true.
>    
>     But when you set up the forwarding that means you do trust google.
> 
> I, personally, might.  But there's no reason for the two operators
> to trust each other just because I said so.

The operators does not need to trust each other. There is no system
wide trust. I as an user of the system X, will trust system Y, as I
myself set it up to forward emails to my system X address. If I do not
trust system Y, why would I set up the forwarding in the first place?

The system X only trust system Y when it is processing my emails, it
does not affect anybody else on the system X.
-- 
[email protected]

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