On Mon, Apr 27, 2026 at 12:13 PM Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote:
> > I would assume what's meant here is that ARC is only truly valuable if > you > > develop some kind of reputation for "good" or "bad" actors in the ARC > chain. > > Without that, ARC's value is arguably limited. (The same argument > applies to > > DKIM.) > > Which wrong. Forwarding does not happen without the recipient knowing > it, thus recipient will KNOW which email serverices are forwarding > emails to him (he has set those forwarding himself). If he has set up > the forwardings himself, he clearly already trustes the service as he > trusts that service to process his emails, thus he can trust the ARC > headers generated by that service. > > There is no need for any kind of global trust, only per recipient > trust and that is easy for him to configure to his recipient system. This presumes a trust relationship between the operator and the user. It amounts to saying that if I tell GMail I'm forwarding mail to this mailbox from elsewhere, GMail must trust the source I name. But why should they trust that I'm acting in good faith and possibly expose themselves to abuse? Also, any trust framework requiring the user to set something up correctly and remember to tear it down later adds technical complexity we may not want, frustrating users who will balk at the resulting user experience. > If I configure this email address to forward elsewhere, does Gmail make > any > > assertions about any identity in the message (apart from, say, its own > DKIM > > signature)? I don't think that's ever true, much less generally true. > > But when you set up the forwarding that means you do trust google. I, personally, might. But there's no reason for the two operators to trust each other just because I said so. -MSK
_______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
