[EM] Query for one and all

[John B. Hodges]

Consider the following single-winner method. Voters submit ranked 
ballots, ties allowed, truncation allowed. (Only one vote allowed for 
each candidate.) First-choice votes are tallied; if anyone gets a 
majority, the one with the largest tally wins. If no one gets a 
majority of first-chioce votes, then second-choice votes are tallied 
and added to the first-choice votes. Again, if anyone has received 
votes from a majority of the ballots, the candidate with the largest 
total wins. And so forth, for as many ranks as there are, until 
someone gets votes from a majority of ballots. If all ballots become 
exhausted and still nobody has received votes from a majority of 
ballots, then the candidate with the largest total wins.

This method has been called "Generalized Bucklin", and AFAICT could 
also be called "Majority Choice Approval".

My question, for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that 
any single-winner method has, that this method does not have?

One likely answer is "Condorcet-efficiency"; this method does not 
seek directly to find the Condorcet-winner. Merrill's simulations 
found plain Approval to have good levels of c-e but not 100%.

Chris Benham has found something called the "bogey-candidate" effect. 
Add that to the list.

So, please, all chip in: what do you know that's bad, about Majority 
Choice Approval?
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John B. Hodges, jbhodges@  @usit.net
Do Justice, Love Mercy, and Be Irreverent.
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