Trivia: B gets at least 9 votes with Plurality, more if voters recognize
the method and adjust their voting.
Agreed that Plurality and Two-round runoffs should lose against any good
system - as should IRV.
If the court cannot do better, perhaps they should throw the case out for
weakness in arguments - I see either side winning producing nothing but
trouble.
DWK
On Sat, 8 Nov 2008 10:02:15 -0500 Terry Bouricius wrote:
But Dave Ketchum's example is about how IRV can fail to elect a Condorcet
winner. This candidate gets zero votes under plurality rules and is
immediately eliminated under two-round runoff rules as well. Plurality and
Two-round runoffs are the two systems the plaintiffs are seeking to
preserve, while "constitutionally" prohibiting Condorcet (as well as IRV).
Terry Bouricius
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dave Ketchum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2008 10:09 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic
voting methods & IRV/STV
Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as:
9 B>A
Now we have 34 voting B>A. Enough that they can expect to win and may
have
as strong a preference between these two as might happen anywhere.
C and D represent issues many feel strongly about - and can want to assert
to encourage action by B, the expected winner. If ONE voter had voted B>A
rather than D>B>A, IRV would have declared B the winner.
Note that Condorcet would have declared B the winner any time the B>A
count
exceeded the A>B count (unless C or D got many more votes).
DWK
On Fri, 7 Nov 2008 14:05:03 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote:
Dave,
I agree with you -that is important too, but the attorneys and
judge(s) have their own criteria for judging importance as compared to
existing laws.
Your example IMO does show unequal treatment of voters, so perhaps
I'll include it as one of many ways to show how IRV unequally treats
voters and see if the attorneys use it or not.
Thanks.
Kathy
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:35 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Topic below is monotonicity, which seems discardable as a side issue.
Of more importance is IRV's NOT CARING whether more voters indicate
preferring A>B or B>A - can even declare A the winner when a majority of
voters prefer B of this pair.
Example:
20 A>B
15 C>B>A
10 D>B>A
Here a majority prefer B>A, but C and D have a special attraction for
some
some minorities.
DWK
On Thu, 6 Nov 2008 11:23:39 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote:
FYI,
Defendants in the MN Case (who are promoting IRV and STV methods) have
just released new affidavits to the court that discuss Arrow's theorem
as supporting the case for IRV/STV and dismissing the importance of
IRV's nonmonotonicity.
I posted three of these most recent affidavits of the defendants of
Instant Runoff Voting and STV here:
http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/
The first two docs listed are by Fair Vote's new expert witness.
The third doc is by the Minneapolis, MN City attorney.
The defendants characterize Arrow's theorem as proving that "there
exists no unequivocally satisfactory, or normatively appealing, voting
rule." and claim the "possibility of nonmonotonic results plagues ALL
potential democratic voting systems with 3 or more candidates unless a
dictatorial voting rule is adopted."
I would appreciate it if any of you have time to read some of the
above three docs, particularly the third document by the attorney, and
give me your responses.
FYI, the plaintiff's characterizes Arrow's theorem on p. 3 of this doc:
http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/11SuplementaryReplyMemoinSupportofMotionforSummaryJudgment.pdf
Thank you.
Kathy
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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