Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
One could e.g. force supporters of the "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one
candidate (at least one of the "remaining" candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their
second preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm would be to stop when someone has
reached >50% approval level.
Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. force the voters to approve at least one on
the "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more than one candidate at different
rounds.)
That is kinda like Bucklin, though without the approval threshold
changing in each round for all voters.
If you're going to have an advanced runoff method, why not do something
explicitly more Condorcetian? Perhaps something like:
Determine the Schwartz set. If it is singular, the candidate wins,
otherwise: the two highest ranked members of the Schwartz set, according
to some Condorcet rule, advance to the runoff.
Another option would be to use D'Hondt without lists, based on a good
Condorcet method, to elect the two candidates for the runoff. But that's
too complex, I think.
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