On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 11:59 PM, Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > --- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds >> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com >> Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 7:59 PM >> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> > One could e.g. force supporters of the >> "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one >> candidate (at least one of the "remaining" >> candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second >> preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm >> would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval >> level. >> > >> > Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. >> force the voters to approve at least one on the >> "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more >> than one candidate at different rounds.) >> >> That is kinda like Bucklin, though without the approval >> threshold >> changing in each round for all voters. >> >> The process could be >> >> 1) Each candidate is designated a strong candidate >> 2) Each ballot is considered to approve the highest ranked >> strong >> candidate and all candidates ranked higher. >> 3) If the most approved candidate has > 50%, then that >> candidate is elected. >> 4) Re-designated the least approved strong candidate a weak >> candidate >> and goto 2). > > Yes, could go this way. > >> >> It still suffers from centre squeeze effects, though. >> >> For example >> >> 45: A>B>C >> 9: B>A>C >> 46: C>B>A >> >> Round 1 >> >> A: 45 >> B: 9 >> C: 46 >> >> no winner, B designated 'weak' >> >> Round 2 >> >> A: 54 >> B: 9 >> C: 41 >> >> A wins. > > How about continuing and allowing the C supporters to compromise and approve > also B. (Just didn't use the 50% termination rule this time.) After this > round B would win and there would be no more interest to compromise (all > voters already either approve the to be winner or would approve it as a > compromise).
If you just keep keep declaring candidates as 'weak' until all candidates are weak, then it is basically approval voting. Once someone passes 50%, that candidate is declared as the potential winner. All ballots are then considered to also approve candidates that they prefer to the potential winner. So, 45: A>B>C Approves A (as highest strong candidate) 9: B>A>C Approves A (as highest strong candidate) Approves B (as weak candidate) 46: C>B>A Approves C (as highest strong) Approves B (as preferred to potential winner) A: 54 B: 55 C: 46 Ofc, it might just be easier to just pick the condorcet winner :), though I am not sure that the above method would always elect the condorcet winner. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info