I would add Nom that nominalism, in both senses (there ate two forms), is a kind of anti-realism. For one kind of Nominalism denies the existence, and therefore the reality, of universals and the other denies the existence, and therefore the reality, of abstract objects. But what does Nominalism claim with respect to the entities alleged by some to be universals or abstract objects, e.g. properties, numbers, propositions, possible worlds? Here there are two general options: (a) to deny the existence of the alleged entities in question, and (b) to accept the existence of these entities but to argue that they are particular or concrete. To the chemist, protons are not 'real' as they are constructed and we can blow them apart. They and smaller 'bricks' are just accounting devices. No doubt I always thought you were in 'denial' mate!
On 24 Nov, 16:36, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote: > I think he is... but I wonder what self-proclaimed "realists" like > Archytas, think? Locke was pretty close to being a nominalist, > however....must have gotten it from his Oxford education... much as he > reportedly disliked it's(Oxford's) classic bent..... > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to epistemology+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
