String theories have been around for about 40 years without throwing
up something we could put to the empirical test Nom. If they do we
will know if was worth poncing about with the speculation or not.
Evidence is nearly always about before we form a theory. We posit
stuff like big bang but then find reason to doubt it. Deutsch is
quite good on how not to write speculation out of thinking. - as idiot
dogma on big bang or anything else does. I'd say you have problems
with 'experience of single physical "res" can be had '.
On 29 Nov, 20:03, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Have been reading the John Worral article... at first blush.....I am quite
> disappointed....if you know the fellow....try to get him to consider my
> point between the "epistemological" distinction of "Subjective" as opposed
> to "Objective" as they (terms) pertain to the distinction between
> Conceptus / Res... as noted above....I think he Morral, et al) could do
> with a review of William of Ockham, as well.... for a distinction between
> Vox (sign) of "first intention" where direct empirical(intuitive)
> experience of single physical "res" can be had (and from which the thinking
> mind forms a "conceptus") as distinguished from Vox (sign) of "second
> intention" where the thinking mind ruminates upon and considers
> ("abstractly") all sorts of separate (presumed similar) "first intention"
> (empirical) experiences and orders them into categories or other such
> rational or logical conclusions or explanations therof....As for his
> apparent mode or method or "reasoning".... it seems to be "propositional"
> and further based on quantities and identity of the "things" being studied
> or considered.....My suggestion is... you can also learn a lot about the
> "things" studied or under consideration through proper logical opposition
> analysis that I have above tried to show at the epistemic level...Through
> opposition, one defines a studied "thing" by concluding what "it" is
> definitely NOT. If some "thing" is epistemologically Realist
> (Conceptus-Objective / Res-Objective) then it cannot be the logical
> contrary Idealist (Conceptus-Subjective / Res-Subjective) or the
> corresponding "half-poles" of the logical square.... Nominalist or
> Phenomenologist....etc.
> As for the rest... I have also treated "ontology" and value judgments that
> give rise to Ethics in human affairs.... these can be noted (very broadly)
> in other of my posts on the internet.... Humanities board... "Snow -White
> Tale analysis.... or if someone is truly interested I can give indications
> to some of my more in depth copyrighted writings (though
> unpublished)....Anyway, my bottom line is.... Worral and this "structural
> Realism" definitely seems NOT to be "Realist" as I (and Realists) define
> the term.... anything "structural" is... abstracted... order of second
> intention Vox or Sign (at best) and , as such tends toward the subjective
> and "Idealist" , at least or "Phenomenologist", at most....( talking about
> Kant's "noumenon" doesn't help Morral's thinking at all... pure garbage
> that, in my opinion) ...."structure" is never "Physical" or objective, in
> my opinion... not even at the mathematical level....I say, stick to the
> empirical data... if not the "unknown object" cause.... then stick to the
> known effects or sensory traces.... get a more precise overview from a
> better figurative ( constructed) sensory organ before you conclude
> anything....But definitely don't go off into "abstracted"
> "Wonder-Land"...talking about the "unobserved".... har....
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 26, 2012 10:11:09 PM UTC-5, archytas wrote:
>
> > Mt own view is the argument has been had. John Worrall did a lot of
> > it years back. You can get a summary here:
> >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/
>
> > It's key in sub-atomic physics that the decay trails we record are
> > more real than the particles we believe we have 'found' but only 'see'
> > through the decay record in several kilometres of instrument.
> > Everything we call real has conditions for existence. But you don't
> > need to know how to build CERN to trap a photon in a Bose-Einstein
> > condensate and 'see' it come out as a matter wave. I don't need to
> > define a proton to tell you how an element is likely to react - etc.
> > Maybe we should be talking about modern reliableism?
>
> > On 27 Nov, 01:02, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > I always took it we are mates Nom - so I can say your paranoia knows
> > > bounds! Mind's Eye hasn't changed much. I don't take you for a
> > > fool. The slap in the face with a wet fish doesn't survive the
> > > sophist rationalisation - but argument such as this never stops
> > > adherents evading wet fish. The Greeks realised arguments plural can
> > > always be made. Their resolution through 'suspended judgement'
> > > doesn't work.
> > > Nominal in finance means : Describing a variable that does not take
> > > inflation into account. For example, when considering GDP growth, if
> > > GDP has grown 10% in nominal terms and the inflation rate is 3%, real
> > > GDP growth is only 7%.
>
> > > Radioactive half-life is supposed invariable - but we think it does
> > > with our distance from the Sun - suggesting a particle - the neutrello
> > > (I forget exactly). You and I could get on the track of it if we
> > > learned the accounting procedures. Philosophy seems to have little to
> > > do with letting 20 ton weights fall on you from a great height because
> > > you don't believe in reality.
>
> > > Colour turned out not to be primary, but shorthand for subjective
> > > appreciation of frequency (my brother is colourblind). We used to
> > > have arguments about colour until he did O level physics. I would
> > > guess more protons are close to identical than me and Chaz - but given
> > > the scale maybe they aren't as simialr as we think? Perhaps some have
> > > freckles? I doubt nominalism or tropical fish realism defines either
> > > of us or is worth a rat's arse.
>
> > > On 26 Nov, 17:41, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Here I am... scatter minded as usual... I meant to say Aristotles'
> > square
> > > > of opposition....but you know thathttp://
> > en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_of_opposition
>
> > > > On Monday, November 26, 2012 12:20:21 PM UTC-5, nominal9 wrote:
>
> > > > > Conceptus / Res... is the distinction that William of Ockham (maybe
> > not
> > > > > the first to do so)....The definitions are pretty much true to
> > modern
> > > > > day.... Concept/ Reference .... Idea / Matter... Mind
> > /Body....Motivation
> > > > > / Action (for living "animal" sorts) and some others, perhaps.....
> > > > > now... a "universal" ... being a composite of separate individual
> > "ideas"
> > > > > in the mind which are perhaps founded on separate observed
> > references
> > > > > (or perhaps not)...the universal in and of itself has no objective
> > > > > substance... and therefore no "reality" per se (e.g. I know one man
> > > > > Archytas and I know another man Chazwin.... they are similar but not
> > > > > identical... I thing I'll call the "conceptual" similarities between
> > the
> > > > > the "universal" man)....the same goes for abstract objects, e.g.
> > > > > properties, numbers, propositions, possible worlds"... they are all
> > > > > operations of the mind.... call them ideas or any of the other
> > related
> > > > > terms I set forth above (Cocept, Mind, Motivation... etc), which is
> > to
> > > > > say... all mental constructs... perhaps of conglomerations of
> > separate
> > > > > experiences of real object "things (or perhaps not)....
> > > > > So of course when you say that nominalists deny the existence and
> > thereby
> > > > > the reality of such universals and such.... well.... of course...
> > you
> > > > > should say that they actually deny the "Objective physical
> > existence" of
> > > > > such conglomerate mental constructs... the way I put it is that
> > ideas,
> > > > > concepts and such have existence ("nonphysical") within the mind...
> > nowhere
> > > > > else, per se....hence my motto.... I have never met a circle or its
> > > > > diameter, but your ass resembles them, like it or not your ass
> > stinks.
> > > > > You should note that nominalists usually have no problem accepting
> > the
> > > > > "physical" or real objective existence of the other side of the
> > > > > "split"....i.e., the Res...Reference....Matter.... Body....
> > Action.....all
> > > > > of which nominalists accept as "rock-solid"....just as I have no
> > problem
> > > > > accepting the real or "physical" existence of Archytas and
> > Chazwin.....I
> > > > > just don't see the two of you sharing in one and the same
> > (identical)
> > > > > "real",as in physical body....
>
> > > > > It gets to a question of how one distributes (or defines) the
> > > > > "epistemological" terms of Subjective or Objective over the base
> > "split"
> > > > > components of a "thinking" or "live" entity... such as an
> > animal..... very
> > > > > broadly....a Realist views it as Conceptus(objective) / Res(
> > > > > objective)...... but an Idealist views it as Conceptus(subjective) /
> > > > > Res(subjective)..... a Nominalist views it as Conceptus(subjective)
> > /
> > > > > Res(objective).... and a Phenomenologist view is as
> > Conceptus(objective)/
> > > > > Res(subjective).....
>
> > > > > How have you been Archytas?.... well, I hope....Here we are, still
> > > > > treading the same epistemological ground....Think... "fours"... I
> > keep
> > > > > trying to say... remember Plato's square of opposition... and switch
> > out
> > > > > the "propositions" with sets of Conceptus / Res.... don't think
> > > > > ....identity.... think.....opposites....
>
> > > > > Democracy / Capitalism......contrary....Totalitarian / Socialism
>
> > > > > Democracy/ Socialism........contrary.....Totalitarian / Capitalism
>
> > > > > On Sunday, November 25, 2012 6:21:21 PM UTC-5, archytas wrote:
>
> > > > >> I would add Nom that nominalism, in both senses (there ate two
> > forms),
> > > > >> is a kind of anti-realism. For one kind of Nominalism denies the
> > > > >> existence, and therefore the reality, of universals and the other
> > > > >> denies the existence, and therefore the reality, of abstract
> > objects.
> > > > >> But what does Nominalism claim with respect to the entities alleged
> > by
> > > > >> some to be universals or abstract objects, e.g. properties,
> > numbers,
> > > > >> propositions, possible worlds? Here there are two general options:
> > (a)
> > > > >> to deny the existence of the alleged entities
>
> ...
>
> read more »
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