Conceptus / Res... is the distinction that William of Ockham (maybe not the
first to do so)....The definitions are pretty much true to modern day....
Concept/ Reference .... Idea / Matter... Mind /Body....Motivation / Action
(for living "animal" sorts) and some others, perhaps.....
now... a "universal" ... being a composite of separate individual "ideas"
in the mind which are perhaps founded on separate observed references
(or perhaps not)...the universal in and of itself has no objective
substance... and therefore no "reality" per se (e.g. I know one man
Archytas and I know another man Chazwin.... they are similar but not
identical... I thing I'll call the "conceptual" similarities between the
the "universal" man)....the same goes for abstract objects, e.g.
properties, numbers, propositions, possible worlds"... they are all
operations of the mind.... call them ideas or any of the other related
terms I set forth above (Cocept, Mind, Motivation... etc), which is to
say... all mental constructs... perhaps of conglomerations of separate
experiences of real object "things (or perhaps not)....
So of course when you say that nominalists deny the existence and thereby
the reality of such universals and such.... well.... of course... you
should say that they actually deny the "Objective physical existence" of
such conglomerate mental constructs... the way I put it is that ideas,
concepts and such have existence ("nonphysical") within the mind... nowhere
else, per se....hence my motto.... I have never met a circle or its
diameter, but your ass resembles them, like it or not your ass stinks.
You should note that nominalists usually have no problem accepting the
"physical" or real objective existence of the other side of the
"split"....i.e., the Res...Reference....Matter.... Body.... Action.....all
of which nominalists accept as "rock-solid"....just as I have no problem
accepting the real or "physical" existence of Archytas and Chazwin.....I
just don't see the two of you sharing in one and the same (identical)
"real",as in physical body....
It gets to a question of how one distributes (or defines) the
"epistemological" terms of Subjective or Objective over the base "split"
components of a "thinking" or "live" entity... such as an animal..... very
broadly....a Realist views it as Conceptus(objective) / Res(
objective)...... but an Idealist views it as Conceptus(subjective) /
Res(subjective)..... a Nominalist views it as Conceptus(subjective) /
Res(objective).... and a Phenomenologist view is as Conceptus(objective)/
Res(subjective).....
How have you been Archytas?.... well, I hope....Here we are, still treading
the same epistemological ground....Think... "fours"... I keep trying to
say... remember Plato's square of opposition... and switch out the
"propositions" with sets of Conceptus / Res.... don't think
....identity.... think.....opposites....
Democracy / Capitalism......contrary....Totalitarian / Socialism
Democracy/ Socialism........contrary.....Totalitarian / Capitalism
On Sunday, November 25, 2012 6:21:21 PM UTC-5, archytas wrote:
>
> I would add Nom that nominalism, in both senses (there ate two forms),
> is a kind of anti-realism. For one kind of Nominalism denies the
> existence, and therefore the reality, of universals and the other
> denies the existence, and therefore the reality, of abstract objects.
> But what does Nominalism claim with respect to the entities alleged by
> some to be universals or abstract objects, e.g. properties, numbers,
> propositions, possible worlds? Here there are two general options: (a)
> to deny the existence of the alleged entities in question, and (b) to
> accept the existence of these entities but to argue that they are
> particular or concrete. To the chemist, protons are not 'real' as
> they are constructed and we can blow them apart. They and smaller
> 'bricks' are just accounting devices. No doubt I always thought you
> were in 'denial' mate!
>
> On 24 Nov, 16:36, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > I think he is... but I wonder what self-proclaimed "realists" like
> > Archytas, think? Locke was pretty close to being a nominalist,
> > however....must have gotten it from his Oxford education... much as he
> > reportedly disliked it's(Oxford's) classic bent.....
> >
> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/
>
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