I printed out the Stanford article and will pore over it.... I like that sort of "stuff"... All the best, for now, Archytas...
On Monday, November 26, 2012 10:11:09 PM UTC-5, archytas wrote: > > Mt own view is the argument has been had. John Worrall did a lot of > it years back. You can get a summary here: > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/ > > It's key in sub-atomic physics that the decay trails we record are > more real than the particles we believe we have 'found' but only 'see' > through the decay record in several kilometres of instrument. > Everything we call real has conditions for existence. But you don't > need to know how to build CERN to trap a photon in a Bose-Einstein > condensate and 'see' it come out as a matter wave. I don't need to > define a proton to tell you how an element is likely to react - etc. > Maybe we should be talking about modern reliableism? > > On 27 Nov, 01:02, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I always took it we are mates Nom - so I can say your paranoia knows > > bounds! Mind's Eye hasn't changed much. I don't take you for a > > fool. The slap in the face with a wet fish doesn't survive the > > sophist rationalisation - but argument such as this never stops > > adherents evading wet fish. The Greeks realised arguments plural can > > always be made. Their resolution through 'suspended judgement' > > doesn't work. > > Nominal in finance means : Describing a variable that does not take > > inflation into account. For example, when considering GDP growth, if > > GDP has grown 10% in nominal terms and the inflation rate is 3%, real > > GDP growth is only 7%. > > > > Radioactive half-life is supposed invariable - but we think it does > > with our distance from the Sun - suggesting a particle - the neutrello > > (I forget exactly). You and I could get on the track of it if we > > learned the accounting procedures. Philosophy seems to have little to > > do with letting 20 ton weights fall on you from a great height because > > you don't believe in reality. > > > > Colour turned out not to be primary, but shorthand for subjective > > appreciation of frequency (my brother is colourblind). We used to > > have arguments about colour until he did O level physics. I would > > guess more protons are close to identical than me and Chaz - but given > > the scale maybe they aren't as simialr as we think? Perhaps some have > > freckles? I doubt nominalism or tropical fish realism defines either > > of us or is worth a rat's arse. > > > > On 26 Nov, 17:41, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Here I am... scatter minded as usual... I meant to say Aristotles' > square > > > of opposition....but you know thathttp:// > en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_of_opposition > > > > > On Monday, November 26, 2012 12:20:21 PM UTC-5, nominal9 wrote: > > > > > > Conceptus / Res... is the distinction that William of Ockham (maybe > not > > > > the first to do so)....The definitions are pretty much true to > modern > > > > day.... Concept/ Reference .... Idea / Matter... Mind > /Body....Motivation > > > > / Action (for living "animal" sorts) and some others, perhaps..... > > > > now... a "universal" ... being a composite of separate individual > "ideas" > > > > in the mind which are perhaps founded on separate observed > references > > > > (or perhaps not)...the universal in and of itself has no objective > > > > substance... and therefore no "reality" per se (e.g. I know one man > > > > Archytas and I know another man Chazwin.... they are similar but not > > > > identical... I thing I'll call the "conceptual" similarities between > the > > > > the "universal" man)....the same goes for abstract objects, e.g. > > > > properties, numbers, propositions, possible worlds"... they are all > > > > operations of the mind.... call them ideas or any of the other > related > > > > terms I set forth above (Cocept, Mind, Motivation... etc), which is > to > > > > say... all mental constructs... perhaps of conglomerations of > separate > > > > experiences of real object "things (or perhaps not).... > > > > So of course when you say that nominalists deny the existence and > thereby > > > > the reality of such universals and such.... well.... of course... > you > > > > should say that they actually deny the "Objective physical > existence" of > > > > such conglomerate mental constructs... the way I put it is that > ideas, > > > > concepts and such have existence ("nonphysical") within the mind... > nowhere > > > > else, per se....hence my motto.... I have never met a circle or its > > > > diameter, but your ass resembles them, like it or not your ass > stinks. > > > > You should note that nominalists usually have no problem accepting > the > > > > "physical" or real objective existence of the other side of the > > > > "split"....i.e., the Res...Reference....Matter.... Body.... > Action.....all > > > > of which nominalists accept as "rock-solid"....just as I have no > problem > > > > accepting the real or "physical" existence of Archytas and > Chazwin.....I > > > > just don't see the two of you sharing in one and the same > (identical) > > > > "real",as in physical body.... > > > > > > It gets to a question of how one distributes (or defines) the > > > > "epistemological" terms of Subjective or Objective over the base > "split" > > > > components of a "thinking" or "live" entity... such as an > animal..... very > > > > broadly....a Realist views it as Conceptus(objective) / Res( > > > > objective)...... but an Idealist views it as Conceptus(subjective) / > > > > Res(subjective)..... a Nominalist views it as Conceptus(subjective) > / > > > > Res(objective).... and a Phenomenologist view is as > Conceptus(objective)/ > > > > Res(subjective)..... > > > > > > How have you been Archytas?.... well, I hope....Here we are, still > > > > treading the same epistemological ground....Think... "fours"... I > keep > > > > trying to say... remember Plato's square of opposition... and switch > out > > > > the "propositions" with sets of Conceptus / Res.... don't think > > > > ....identity.... think.....opposites.... > > > > > > Democracy / Capitalism......contrary....Totalitarian / Socialism > > > > > > Democracy/ Socialism........contrary.....Totalitarian / Capitalism > > > > > > On Sunday, November 25, 2012 6:21:21 PM UTC-5, archytas wrote: > > > > > >> I would add Nom that nominalism, in both senses (there ate two > forms), > > > >> is a kind of anti-realism. For one kind of Nominalism denies the > > > >> existence, and therefore the reality, of universals and the other > > > >> denies the existence, and therefore the reality, of abstract > objects. > > > >> But what does Nominalism claim with respect to the entities alleged > by > > > >> some to be universals or abstract objects, e.g. properties, > numbers, > > > >> propositions, possible worlds? Here there are two general options: > (a) > > > >> to deny the existence of the alleged entities in question, and (b) > to > > > >> accept the existence of these entities but to argue that they are > > > >> particular or concrete. To the chemist, protons are not 'real' as > > > >> they are constructed and we can blow them apart. They and smaller > > > >> 'bricks' are just accounting devices. No doubt I always thought > you > > > >> were in 'denial' mate! > > > > > >> On 24 Nov, 16:36, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > >> > I think he is... but I wonder what self-proclaimed "realists" > like > > > >> > Archytas, think? Locke was pretty close to being a nominalist, > > > >> > however....must have gotten it from his Oxford education... much > as he > > > >> > reportedly disliked it's(Oxford's) classic bent..... > > > > > >> >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/ > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. 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