Mr. Ornstein, I read your abstract and liked it....agreed with it, largely, as to its content. You asked for comments and corrections, so I offer a possible grammatical correction (or maybe I misunderstood the structure of your sentence). On page 8 of your essay you wrote the following:
"Since it is only such formulations [that axiomatically define a word (all) in a way that logically conflicts with what can be observed] might insure the kind of falsification that Karl Popper proposed to be so important in science, his arguments about falsification are trivial and unhelpful." As you should see (if the writing program represented it properly), I left a gap mid-sentence. This is where there may be a grammatical error. I wonder if a conjunctive pronoun such as "that" or "which" is lacking to make this sentence more clear? I point this out not to be a stickler but as a "proofing" of your essay that is intended for publication. As to your content, again, I agreed "largely" with what your essay says. it was well written and very understandable, as well. I particularly agreed with your summation of the scientific method... the "model / empirical experiment" approach... I also liked your references to other current "philosophical (?)" approaches to these questions such as the distinction between Post Modernists and Positivists. I would say that you have much less to criticize about the Positivists than you have to criticize about the Post Modernists. As an aside, this would seem to favor more my view than the view of my friend Archytas (HAR)... which, of course tickles me pink... Also, I noted that you referred in your essay to Ockham's Razor.... I like Ockham, myself, but much more than for his "razor"... I like Ockham for his of VOX... separated and composite- composed of Conceptus (Concept) directed at Res(physical thing)... Ockham'c First Intention VOX are very much like the initial observational stage of the "scientific" method"... observing empirical physical things to arrive at a conceptual model ... subsequently verified by further physical experiments to establish recurring reliability.....Ockham also suggested Second Intention VOX which continue within the thinking mind "abstractly" and formulate all sorts of other "thought-up" relations within and among both the Conceptus side and the Res side of "things".... Anyway, I think that "scientific method" has much in common with and relies a lot on the basic framework supplied by William Of Ockham (and others)... Now, I have one question as to your terminology... would you define your terms "subjective" and "objective" as they are to be understood within your "thinking"? Let me put it this way....It appeared to me that around page five, mostly, you rendered the division (or separation) between: 1) the actual (out-of-mind) physical entity; 2) the sense experience (inside-mind) mental image and 3) the eventual (inside-mind) explanatory model. Now this "model" as you call it was then communicated as the "theory in progress of ongoing verification" that is communicated to others and understood as shared meaning....you conclude then by getting to the following statement: "The more precise the communication of meaning, the more objective in is usually perceived to be. The more ambiguous (the more interpretation may vary from person to person), the more subjective." Now here's my question.....what do the terms "objective and subjective" that you use here actually refer to?... is the1) the actual (out-of-mind) physical entity OBJECTIVE? Is the 2) the sense experience (inside-mind) mental image SUBJECTIVE? And is the 3) the eventual (inside-mind) explanatory model. SUBJECTIVE?... that is what I would propose. And that is not what your sentence quoted above actually says.... I propose that Objective should be defined as the ...1)actual out-of-mind Physical thing... and "differently" that anything which is.... 2) in the mind or 3)a product of the mind's workings..... should be termed subjective..... If you have the time and inclination, Mr. Ornstein.....maybe you can clarify this (or your opinion of this) for me. Essence, Mr Ornstein is another term that you make use of and which is not defined... this gets into the question of universals and is a related to the subjective-objective, empirical-abstractive differences. Let me put it this way.....I have difficulty with the "Idealist-Platonists"... and the Phenomenologists calling some (out -of-mind ) things.... Subjective... when they have independent "physicality"... on the other hand I don't much care for the Materialist-Realists and the Phenomenologists calling some (in-mind) thought or thought products in particular Objective when thoughts or thought products are devoid of physicality... My bugaboo.....I suppose.... just doesn't make "sense" to me... as a William of Ockham nominalist.... On Thursday, January 10, 2013 1:39:18 PM UTC-5, lenor...@pipeline.com Ornstein wrote: > > *The Skeptical Scientific Mind-Set in the Spectrum of Belief: It’s about > models of ‘reality’ – and the unavoidable incompleteness of evidence, for – > or against – any model or fact. > * > Leonard Ornstein > > *Abstract * > > This essay examines topics that relate to the origins of beliefs, in > general – and particularly, to ‘belief-in’ the sciences – and how beliefs > impact our ability to cope with real-world problems: > > Introspection about personal experiences of the external world, using > the ‘images’ created by our sense organs (especially our vision) should > convince us that we are usually aware of a great more detail than our > finite vocabularies of words and symbols equip us to manage. So all models > (stories/speculations/hypotheses/theories/laws) that we construct to > communicate meaning about those experiences must be caricatures of a richer > and more complex private set of conscious and unconscious images and > impressions. As a result, at best, we can only build stripped-down, > verbal/symbolic sketches about the world. These can hardly be expected to > be complete models of absolute and (final?) ‘truth’. > > Communication between individuals and groups likely developed as a means > to, on average, increase the quality of life (the probability of survival, > safety, convenience and comfort) compared to ‘going it alone’. For each of > the communicating partners, the meanings of those communications had to be > believed to be the ‘same’ to try to maximize the fulfillment of such > intentions. Therefore, the voiced-words/symbols/codes, and the fundamental > rules for their use, needed to be arbitrarily agreed upon to ‘assure’ > identical intended meanings. This is exactly the function of axiomatic > definitions and rules at the roots of model building for languages, for > mathematics and for logic. The qualifications and limitations that apply to > languages, math and logic must be very similar to those for building models > for all systems of belief (ideologies, religions and science). Deductive > reasoning and inductive reasoning are the tools used to examine the > consequences of the axiomatics. How axiomatics and reason might fail to > lead us to ‘truth' and certainty about models therefore also requires > understanding of inherent limitations imposed on both deductive and > inductive reasoning. > > Sciences differ from ideologies, from most mathematics and from > religions. The latter require undiluted, absolute faith/belief in the > ‘truth’ of their axiomatics. However, science accepts (also axiomatically) > that the degree-of-belief/confidence-in its models can never be absolute. > The degree-of-belief is measured by how strongly pertinent, empirical > evidence – developed through repeated observation and ‘testing’, and always > limited by uncertainties of inductive reasoning, confirm the > predictions/projections of the models. > > Such degrees-of-belief are analogue (expressed quantitatively, as > ‘different shades of grey’) rather than digital [expressed as black and > white (false or true)]. Scientific models of observable phenomena (objects > and processes), provide simpler and more reliable explanations than those > of non-scientific disciplines and ideologies. Ockham’s Razor – the dictum > to choose the simplest explanation, all other things being equal – > therefore generally recommends placing scientific models ahead of ideologic > models of observable phenomena. > > These differences are sources of science’s great potential to self-correct > – and with ever increasing confidence – to incrementally (though often > sporadically) improve quality of life. > > > In teaching, and in the general valuation of science, these topics, and > their contributions to improving the quality of life, are increasingly > neglected. They are explored to better clarify how > science fits into the wide spectrum of beliefs – (and perhaps help reverse > this disturbing trend ;-) > > http://www.pipeline.com/~lenornst/ScienceInTheSpectrumOfBelief.pdf > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/epistemology/-/uOiXY07BUZwJ. 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