PS... Archytas, et al... have you read the article? Apart from my picayune "epistemological" points of disagreement....It is very, very good. I agree with it... 90% I'd say......... for whatever my opinion is worth.....HAR.
On Tuesday, January 15, 2013 2:26:22 PM UTC-5, nominal9 wrote: > > Mr. Ornstein, > I read your abstract and liked it....agreed with it, largely, as to its > content. > You asked for comments and corrections, so I offer a possible grammatical > correction (or maybe I misunderstood the structure of your sentence). On > page 8 of your essay you wrote the following: > > "Since it is only such formulations [that axiomatically define a word > (all) in a way that logically conflicts with what can be observed] > might insure the kind of falsification that Karl Popper > proposed to be so important in science, his arguments about falsification > are trivial and unhelpful." > > As you should see (if the writing program represented it properly), I left > a gap mid-sentence. This is where there may be a grammatical error. I > wonder if a conjunctive pronoun such as "that" or "which" is lacking to > make this sentence more clear? I point this out not to be a stickler but as > a "proofing" of your essay that is intended for publication. > > As to your content, again, I agreed "largely" with what your essay says. > it was well written and very understandable, as well. I particularly agreed > with your summation of the scientific method... the "model / empirical > experiment" approach... I also liked your references to other current > "philosophical (?)" approaches to these questions such as the distinction > between Post Modernists and Positivists. I would say that you have much > less to criticize about the Positivists than you have to criticize about > the Post Modernists. As an aside, this would seem to favor more my view > than the view of my friend Archytas (HAR)... which, of course tickles me > pink... Also, I noted that you referred in your essay to Ockham's Razor.... > I like Ockham, myself, but much more than for his "razor"... I like Ockham > for his of VOX... separated and composite- composed of Conceptus (Concept) > directed at Res(physical thing)... Ockham'c First Intention VOX are very > much like the initial observational stage of the "scientific" method"... > observing empirical physical things to arrive at a conceptual model ... > subsequently verified by further physical experiments to establish > recurring reliability.....Ockham also suggested Second Intention VOX which > continue within the thinking mind "abstractly" and formulate all sorts of > other "thought-up" relations within and among both the Conceptus side and > the Res side of "things".... > > Anyway, I think that "scientific method" has much in common with and > relies a lot on the basic framework supplied by William Of Ockham (and > others)... > > Now, I have one question as to your terminology... would you define your > terms "subjective" and "objective" as they are to be understood within your > "thinking"? Let me put it this way....It appeared to me that around page > five, mostly, you rendered the division (or separation) between: 1) the > actual (out-of-mind) physical entity; 2) the sense experience > (inside-mind) mental image and 3) the eventual (inside-mind) explanatory > model. Now this "model" as you call it was then communicated as the "theory > in progress of ongoing verification" that is communicated to others and > understood as shared meaning....you conclude then by getting to the > following statement: > "The more precise the communication of meaning, the more objective in is > usually perceived to be. The more ambiguous (the more interpretation may > vary from person to person), the more subjective." > Now here's my question.....what do the terms "objective and subjective" > that you use here actually refer to?... is the1) the actual (out-of-mind) > physical entity OBJECTIVE? Is the 2) the sense experience (inside-mind) > mental image SUBJECTIVE? And is the 3) the eventual (inside-mind) > explanatory model. SUBJECTIVE?... that is what I would propose. And that is > not what your sentence quoted above actually says.... I propose that > Objective should be defined as the ...1)actual out-of-mind Physical > thing... and "differently" that anything which is.... 2) in the mind or 3)a > product of the mind's workings..... should be termed subjective..... > > If you have the time and inclination, Mr. Ornstein.....maybe you can > clarify this (or your opinion of this) for me. > > Essence, Mr Ornstein is another term that you make use of and which is not > defined... this gets into the question of universals and is a related to > the subjective-objective, empirical-abstractive differences. > > Let me put it this way.....I have difficulty with the > "Idealist-Platonists"... and the Phenomenologists calling some (out > -of-mind ) things.... Subjective... when they have independent > "physicality"... on the other hand I don't much care for the > Materialist-Realists and the Phenomenologists calling some (in-mind) > thought or thought products in particular Objective when thoughts or > thought products are devoid of physicality... > > My bugaboo.....I suppose.... just doesn't make "sense" to me... as a > William of Ockham nominalist.... > > On Thursday, January 10, 2013 1:39:18 PM UTC-5, lenornst@pipeline.comOrnstein > wrote: >> >> *The Skeptical Scientific Mind-Set in the Spectrum of Belief: It’s about >> models of ‘reality’ – and the unavoidable incompleteness of evidence, for – >> or against – any model or fact. >> * >> Leonard Ornstein >> >> *Abstract * >> >> This essay examines topics that relate to the origins of beliefs, in >> general – and particularly, to ‘belief-in’ the sciences – and how beliefs >> impact our ability to cope with real-world problems: >> >> Introspection about personal experiences of the external world, using >> the ‘images’ created by our sense organs (especially our vision) should >> convince us that we are usually aware of a great more detail than our >> finite vocabularies of words and symbols equip us to manage. So all models >> (stories/speculations/hypotheses/theories/laws) that we construct to >> communicate meaning about those experiences must be caricatures of a richer >> and more complex private set of conscious and unconscious images and >> impressions. As a result, at best, we can only build stripped-down, >> verbal/symbolic sketches about the world. These can hardly be expected to >> be complete models of absolute and (final?) ‘truth’. >> >> Communication between individuals and groups likely developed as a >> means to, on average, increase the quality of life (the probability of >> survival, safety, convenience and comfort) compared to ‘going it alone’. >> For each of the communicating partners, the meanings of those >> communications had to be believed to be the ‘same’ to try to maximize the >> fulfillment of such intentions. Therefore, the voiced-words/symbols/codes, >> and the fundamental rules for their use, needed to be arbitrarily agreed >> upon to ‘assure’ identical intended meanings. This is exactly the function >> of axiomatic definitions and rules at the roots of model building for >> languages, for mathematics and for logic. The qualifications and >> limitations that apply to languages, math and logic must be very similar to >> those for building models for all systems of belief (ideologies, religions >> and science). Deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning are the tools >> used to examine the consequences of the axiomatics. How axiomatics and >> reason might fail to lead us to ‘truth' and certainty about models >> therefore also requires understanding of inherent limitations imposed on >> both deductive and inductive reasoning. >> >> Sciences differ from ideologies, from most mathematics and from >> religions. The latter require undiluted, absolute faith/belief in the >> ‘truth’ of their axiomatics. However, science accepts (also axiomatically) >> that the degree-of-belief/confidence-in its models can never be absolute. >> The degree-of-belief is measured by how strongly pertinent, empirical >> evidence – developed through repeated observation and ‘testing’, and always >> limited by uncertainties of inductive reasoning, confirm the >> predictions/projections of the models. >> >> Such degrees-of-belief are analogue (expressed quantitatively, as >> ‘different shades of grey’) rather than digital [expressed as black and >> white (false or true)]. Scientific models of observable phenomena (objects >> and processes), provide simpler and more reliable explanations than those >> of non-scientific disciplines and ideologies. Ockham’s Razor – the dictum >> to choose the simplest explanation, all other things being equal – >> therefore generally recommends placing scientific models ahead of ideologic >> models of observable phenomena. >> >> These differences are sources of science’s great potential to >> self-correct – and with ever increasing confidence – to incrementally >> (though often sporadically) improve quality of life. >> >> >> In teaching, and in the general valuation of science, these topics, >> and their contributions to improving the quality of life, are increasingly >> neglected. They are explored to better clarify how >> science fits into the wide spectrum of beliefs – (and perhaps help >> reverse this disturbing trend ;-) >> >> http://www.pipeline.com/~lenornst/ScienceInTheSpectrumOfBelief.pdf >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. 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