"Sciences differ from ideologies, from most mathematics and from religions. The latter require undiluted, absolute faith/belief in the ‘truth’ of their axiomatics" - from Ornstein's paper (early).
Can we really believe this? It seems right, and yet do people really believe in the 'absolute' way at all? They may say so - yet I don't see much evidence in the actual world. Do people really bow to god/s or in performance to people around them to be part of the club? On Jan 21, 4:51 pm, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote: > I'm not sure how to value dung-beetle droppings Nom - but ... HAR. > Much to agree with in Ornstein's papers - the one referenced at the > end of the latest one is much to my own view. The problem I have is I > don't believe most people enter into the lists of argument, clinging > instead to a world-view more or less immutable and that most > 'argument' is, in any case, a performance aimed at succor to ideology. > 'Evidence- based decision-making' has been around a long time, as have > assertions we should get our politicians and others in power to > involve themselves and be capable of it. I see very little sign of > any of it. Even most scientists are no good at it. In a western from > years back Dean Martin says 'I never got much by arguing' - he's > feeling his gun. Most people are so poor in argument they know it's > not much use to them and they won't give up to its arbitration. So > Ornstein is 90% right, and much as I agree, not much help in shifting > education and politics to somewhere more sensible. Good to see the > stuff though. > > On Jan 15, 7:33 pm, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > PS... Archytas, et al... have you read the article? Apart from my picayune > > "epistemological" points of disagreement....It is very, very good. I agree > > with it... 90% I'd say......... for whatever my opinion is worth.....HAR. > > > On Tuesday, January 15, 2013 2:26:22 PM UTC-5, nominal9 wrote: > > > > Mr. Ornstein, > > > I read your abstract and liked it....agreed with it, largely, as to its > > > content. > > > You asked for comments and corrections, so I offer a possible grammatical > > > correction (or maybe I misunderstood the structure of your sentence). On > > > page 8 of your essay you wrote the following: > > > > "Since it is only such formulations [that axiomatically define a word > > > (all) in a way that logically conflicts with what can be observed] > > > might insure the kind of falsification that Karl Popper > > > proposed to be so important in science, his arguments about falsification > > > are trivial and unhelpful." > > > > As you should see (if the writing program represented it properly), I left > > > a gap mid-sentence. This is where there may be a grammatical error. I > > > wonder if a conjunctive pronoun such as "that" or "which" is lacking to > > > make this sentence more clear? I point this out not to be a stickler but > > > as > > > a "proofing" of your essay that is intended for publication. > > > > As to your content, again, I agreed "largely" with what your essay says. > > > it was well written and very understandable, as well. I particularly > > > agreed > > > with your summation of the scientific method... the "model / empirical > > > experiment" approach... I also liked your references to other current > > > "philosophical (?)" approaches to these questions such as the distinction > > > between Post Modernists and Positivists. I would say that you have much > > > less to criticize about the Positivists than you have to criticize about > > > the Post Modernists. As an aside, this would seem to favor more my view > > > than the view of my friend Archytas (HAR)... which, of course tickles me > > > pink... Also, I noted that you referred in your essay to Ockham's > > > Razor.... > > > I like Ockham, myself, but much more than for his "razor"... I like Ockham > > > for his of VOX... separated and composite- composed of Conceptus > > > (Concept) > > > directed at Res(physical thing)... Ockham'c First Intention VOX are very > > > much like the initial observational stage of the "scientific" method"... > > > observing empirical physical things to arrive at a conceptual model ... > > > subsequently verified by further physical experiments to establish > > > recurring reliability.....Ockham also suggested Second Intention VOX which > > > continue within the thinking mind "abstractly" and formulate all sorts of > > > other "thought-up" relations within and among both the Conceptus side and > > > the Res side of "things".... > > > > Anyway, I think that "scientific method" has much in common with and > > > relies a lot on the basic framework supplied by William Of Ockham (and > > > others)... > > > > Now, I have one question as to your terminology... would you define your > > > terms "subjective" and "objective" as they are to be understood within > > > your > > > "thinking"? Let me put it this way....It appeared to me that around page > > > five, mostly, you rendered the division (or separation) between: 1) the > > > actual (out-of-mind) physical entity; 2) the sense experience > > > (inside-mind) mental image and 3) the eventual (inside-mind) explanatory > > > model. Now this "model" as you call it was then communicated as the > > > "theory > > > in progress of ongoing verification" that is communicated to others and > > > understood as shared meaning....you conclude then by getting to the > > > following statement: > > > "The more precise the communication of meaning, the more objective in is > > > usually perceived to be. The more ambiguous (the more interpretation may > > > vary from person to person), the more subjective." > > > Now here's my question.....what do the terms "objective and subjective" > > > that you use here actually refer to?... is the1) the actual (out-of-mind) > > > physical entity OBJECTIVE? Is the 2) the sense experience (inside-mind) > > > mental image SUBJECTIVE? And is the 3) the eventual (inside-mind) > > > explanatory model. SUBJECTIVE?... that is what I would propose. And that > > > is > > > not what your sentence quoted above actually says.... I propose that > > > Objective should be defined as the ...1)actual out-of-mind Physical > > > thing... and "differently" that anything which is.... 2) in the mind or > > > 3)a > > > product of the mind's workings..... should be termed subjective..... > > > > If you have the time and inclination, Mr. Ornstein.....maybe you can > > > clarify this (or your opinion of this) for me. > > > > Essence, Mr Ornstein is another term that you make use of and which is not > > > defined... this gets into the question of universals and is a related to > > > the subjective-objective, empirical-abstractive differences. > > > > Let me put it this way.....I have difficulty with the > > > "Idealist-Platonists"... and the Phenomenologists calling some (out > > > -of-mind ) things.... Subjective... when they have independent > > > "physicality"... on the other hand I don't much care for the > > > Materialist-Realists and the Phenomenologists calling some (in-mind) > > > thought or thought products in particular Objective when thoughts or > > > thought products are devoid of physicality... > > > > My bugaboo.....I suppose.... just doesn't make "sense" to me... as a > > > William of Ockham nominalist.... > > > > On Thursday, January 10, 2013 1:39:18 PM UTC-5, > > > lenor...@pipeline.comOrnstein wrote: > > > >> *The Skeptical Scientific Mind-Set in the Spectrum of Belief: It’s about > > >> models of ‘reality’ – and the unavoidable incompleteness of evidence, > > >> for – > > >> or against – any model or fact. > > >> * > > >> Leonard Ornstein > > > >> *Abstract * > > > >> This essay examines topics that relate to the origins of beliefs, in > > >> general – and particularly, to ‘belief-in’ the sciences – and how beliefs > > >> impact our ability to cope with real-world problems: > > > >> Introspection about personal experiences of the external world, using > > >> the ‘images’ created by our sense organs (especially our vision) should > > >> convince us that we are usually aware of a great more detail than our > > >> finite vocabularies of words and symbols equip us to manage. So all > > >> models > > >> (stories/speculations/hypotheses/theories/laws) that we construct to > > >> communicate meaning about those experiences must be caricatures of a > > >> richer > > >> and more complex private set of conscious and unconscious images and > > >> impressions. As a result, at best, we can only build stripped-down, > > >> verbal/symbolic sketches about the world. These can hardly be expected to > > >> be complete models of absolute and (final?) ‘truth’. > > > >> Communication between individuals and groups likely developed as a > > >> means to, on average, increase the quality of life (the probability of > > >> survival, safety, convenience and comfort) compared to ‘going it alone’. > > >> For each of the communicating partners, the meanings of those > > >> communications had to be believed to be the ‘same’ to try to maximize > > >> the > > >> fulfillment of such intentions. Therefore, the > > >> voiced-words/symbols/codes, > > >> and the fundamental rules for their use, needed to be arbitrarily agreed > > >> upon to ‘assure’ identical intended meanings. This is exactly the > > >> function > > >> of axiomatic definitions and rules at the roots of model building for > > >> languages, for mathematics and for logic. The qualifications and > > >> limitations that apply to languages, math and logic must be very similar > > >> to > > >> those for building models for all systems of belief (ideologies, > > >> religions > > >> and science). Deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning are the tools > > >> used to examine the consequences of the axiomatics. How axiomatics and > > >> reason might fail to lead us to ‘truth' and certainty about models > > >> therefore also requires understanding of inherent limitations imposed on > > >> both deductive and inductive reasoning. > > > >> Sciences differ from ideologies, from most mathematics and from > > >> religions. The latter require undiluted, absolute faith/belief in the > > >> ‘truth’ of their axiomatics. However, science accepts (also > > >> axiomatically) > > >> that the degree-of-belief/confidence-in its models can never be absolute. > > >> The degree-of-belief is measured by how strongly pertinent, empirical > > >> evidence – developed through repeated observation and ‘testing’, and > > >> always > > >> limited by uncertainties of inductive reasoning, confirm the > > >> predictions/projections of the models. > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to epistemology+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
