This would be the key bit mate: What requires explanation is why this [scientific realism] is a philosophical position rather than just a common sense one. Consider, for example, tropical fish realism—the doctrine that there really are tropical fish; that the little books you buy about them at pet stores tend to get it approximately right about their appearance, behavior, food and temperature requirements, etc.; and that the fish have these properties largely independently of our theories about them. That’s a pretty clear doctrine, but it’s so commonsensical that it doesn’t seem to have any particular philosophical import. Why is the analogous doctrine about science a philosophical doctrine? There's more in this https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/1685/Hjorland488506.pdf?sequence=2
Ornstein is broadly right in my view - yet under critical eye all our argument turns out to be oversimplification etc. There's an earlier Boyd article in the SEP somewhere with more focus on TFR. Not all religionists are barking fundamentalists and Islam has stuff in it about the way of life needing to change in the future - though the holy texts don't survive detailed historical scrutiny etc. I'm pretty sure we could form a database engine that would flag up nearly all political spin as appealing to ignorance and ideological rot and myth in real time - in a sense academic debate is supposed to make the mobile army of metaphors it uses clear - but there is much we still assume in silence and many tricks used to make the argument coherent. We might say the dark matter and energy of this Unsaid are heavier than what we manage to say. To get at what Orn is on about in detail I'd probably look at a science that fringes with non-science decision - as in forensics. There is clear evidence here that cops, lawyers, judges, juries and forensic practitioners skew towards prosecution and that daft notions like 'credibility' and the reliability of eye witnesses remain in use despite strong scientific evidence to the contrary. The Nico Bento case is a classic - he was convicted of murder where there was no murder and the CCTV evidence had would have saved him skewed by an 'expert' so the jury was not to believe the evidence in front of its eyes. 'Expert' was a dire crank with dire form for same before he topped himself. What is the record of politicians deciding on scientific matters? And the non-scientific community? And scientists operating outside their specialisms (common assumption paradigms)? What of 'Silent Spring' and many examples of scientists in the pay of interests? On 22 Jan, 18:42, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote: > but in my experience most scientists do Boyd's > 'tropical fish realism'. / Archytas..... > > I'd like look into this Boyd "character".....what's his full name... R.N. > Boyd? > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ > > and is this, "roughly"..... your view of 'tropical fish realism'? > > On Thursday, January 10, 2013 1:39:18 PM UTC-5, lenor...@pipeline.com > > > > > > > > Ornstein wrote: > > > *The Skeptical Scientific Mind-Set in the Spectrum of Belief: It’s about > > models of ‘reality’ – and the unavoidable incompleteness of evidence, for – > > or against – any model or fact. > > * > > Leonard Ornstein > > > *Abstract * > > > This essay examines topics that relate to the origins of beliefs, in > > general – and particularly, to ‘belief-in’ the sciences – and how beliefs > > impact our ability to cope with real-world problems: > > > Introspection about personal experiences of the external world, using > > the ‘images’ created by our sense organs (especially our vision) should > > convince us that we are usually aware of a great more detail than our > > finite vocabularies of words and symbols equip us to manage. So all models > > (stories/speculations/hypotheses/theories/laws) that we construct to > > communicate meaning about those experiences must be caricatures of a richer > > and more complex private set of conscious and unconscious images and > > impressions. As a result, at best, we can only build stripped-down, > > verbal/symbolic sketches about the world. These can hardly be expected to > > be complete models of absolute and (final?) ‘truth’. > > > Communication between individuals and groups likely developed as a means > > to, on average, increase the quality of life (the probability of survival, > > safety, convenience and comfort) compared to ‘going it alone’. For each of > > the communicating partners, the meanings of those communications had to be > > believed to be the ‘same’ to try to maximize the fulfillment of such > > intentions. Therefore, the voiced-words/symbols/codes, and the fundamental > > rules for their use, needed to be arbitrarily agreed upon to ‘assure’ > > identical intended meanings. This is exactly the function of axiomatic > > definitions and rules at the roots of model building for languages, for > > mathematics and for logic. The qualifications and limitations that apply to > > languages, math and logic must be very similar to those for building models > > for all systems of belief (ideologies, religions and science). Deductive > > reasoning and inductive reasoning are the tools used to examine the > > consequences of the axiomatics. How axiomatics and reason might fail to > > lead us to ‘truth' and certainty about models therefore also requires > > understanding of inherent limitations imposed on both deductive and > > inductive reasoning. > > > Sciences differ from ideologies, from most mathematics and from > > religions. The latter require undiluted, absolute faith/belief in the > > ‘truth’ of their axiomatics. However, science accepts (also axiomatically) > > that the degree-of-belief/confidence-in its models can never be absolute. > > The degree-of-belief is measured by how strongly pertinent, empirical > > evidence – developed through repeated observation and ‘testing’, and always > > limited by uncertainties of inductive reasoning, confirm the > > predictions/projections of the models. > > > Such degrees-of-belief are analogue (expressed quantitatively, as > > ‘different shades of grey’) rather than digital [expressed as black and > > white (false or true)]. Scientific models of observable phenomena (objects > > and processes), provide simpler and more reliable explanations than those > > of non-scientific disciplines and ideologies. Ockham’s Razor – the dictum > > to choose the simplest explanation, all other things being equal – > > therefore generally recommends placing scientific models ahead of ideologic > > models of observable phenomena. > > > These differences are sources of science’s great potential to self-correct > > – and with ever increasing confidence – to incrementally (though often > > sporadically) improve quality of life. > > > In teaching, and in the general valuation of science, these topics, and > > their contributions to improving the quality of life, are increasingly > > neglected. They are explored to better clarify how > > science fits into the wide spectrum of beliefs – (and perhaps help reverse > > this disturbing trend ;-) > > >http://www.pipeline.com/~lenornst/ScienceInTheSpectrumOfBelief.pdf -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. 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