I'm not sure how to value dung-beetle droppings Nom - but ... HAR. / Archytas
what do you refer to and mean by that.... Archytas?... don't swipe my HAR... HAR Getting back to dung beetles... Is this what you had in mind? http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23110-dung-beetles-navigate-using-the-milky-way.html I'll read your referenced "tropical fish realism" articles and "try" (HAR) to comment On Thursday, January 24, 2013 2:07:04 AM UTC-5, archytas wrote: > > This would be the key bit mate: > What requires explanation is why this [scientific realism] is a > philosophical > position rather than just a common sense one. Consider, for example, > tropical fish realism—the doctrine that there really are tropical > fish; > that the little books you buy about them at pet stores tend to get it > approximately right about their appearance, behavior, food and > temperature > requirements, etc.; and that the fish have these properties > largely independently of our theories about them. That’s a pretty > clear > doctrine, but it’s so commonsensical that it doesn’t seem to have any > particular philosophical import. Why is the analogous doctrine about > science a philosophical doctrine? > There's more in this > https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/1685/Hjorland488506.pdf?sequence=2 > > > Ornstein is broadly right in my view - yet under critical eye all our > argument turns out to be oversimplification etc. There's an earlier > Boyd article in the SEP somewhere with more focus on TFR. Not all > religionists are barking fundamentalists and Islam has stuff in it > about the way of life needing to change in the future - though the > holy texts don't survive detailed historical scrutiny etc. > > I'm pretty sure we could form a database engine that would flag up > nearly all political spin as appealing to ignorance and ideological > rot and myth in real time - in a sense academic debate is supposed to > make the mobile army of metaphors it uses clear - but there is much we > still assume in silence and many tricks used to make the argument > coherent. We might say the dark matter and energy of this Unsaid are > heavier than what we manage to say. > > To get at what Orn is on about in detail I'd probably look at a > science that fringes with non-science decision - as in forensics. > There is clear evidence here that cops, lawyers, judges, juries and > forensic practitioners skew towards prosecution and that daft notions > like 'credibility' and the reliability of eye witnesses remain in use > despite strong scientific evidence to the contrary. The Nico Bento > case is a classic - he was convicted of murder where there was no > murder and the CCTV evidence had would have saved him skewed by an > 'expert' so the jury was not to believe the evidence in front of its > eyes. 'Expert' was a dire crank with dire form for same before he > topped himself. What is the record of politicians deciding on > scientific matters? And the non-scientific community? And scientists > operating outside their specialisms (common assumption paradigms)? > What of 'Silent Spring' and many examples of scientists in the pay of > interests? > > On 22 Jan, 18:42, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > but in my experience most scientists do Boyd's > > 'tropical fish realism'. / Archytas..... > > > > I'd like look into this Boyd "character".....what's his full name... > R.N. > > Boyd? > > > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ > > > > and is this, "roughly"..... your view of 'tropical fish realism'? > > > > On Thursday, January 10, 2013 1:39:18 PM UTC-5, lenor...@pipeline.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ornstein wrote: > > > > > *The Skeptical Scientific Mind-Set in the Spectrum of Belief: It’s > about > > > models of ‘reality’ – and the unavoidable incompleteness of evidence, > for – > > > or against – any model or fact. > > > * > > > Leonard Ornstein > > > > > *Abstract * > > > > > This essay examines topics that relate to the origins of beliefs, in > > > general – and particularly, to ‘belief-in’ the sciences – and how > beliefs > > > impact our ability to cope with real-world problems: > > > > > Introspection about personal experiences of the external world, > using > > > the ‘images’ created by our sense organs (especially our vision) > should > > > convince us that we are usually aware of a great more detail than our > > > finite vocabularies of words and symbols equip us to manage. So all > models > > > (stories/speculations/hypotheses/theories/laws) that we construct to > > > communicate meaning about those experiences must be caricatures of a > richer > > > and more complex private set of conscious and unconscious images and > > > impressions. As a result, at best, we can only build stripped-down, > > > verbal/symbolic sketches about the world. These can hardly be expected > to > > > be complete models of absolute and (final?) ‘truth’. > > > > > Communication between individuals and groups likely developed as a > means > > > to, on average, increase the quality of life (the probability of > survival, > > > safety, convenience and comfort) compared to ‘going it alone’. For > each of > > > the communicating partners, the meanings of those communications had > to be > > > believed to be the ‘same’ to try to maximize the fulfillment of such > > > intentions. Therefore, the voiced-words/symbols/codes, and the > fundamental > > > rules for their use, needed to be arbitrarily agreed upon to ‘assure’ > > > identical intended meanings. This is exactly the function of axiomatic > > > definitions and rules at the roots of model building for languages, > for > > > mathematics and for logic. The qualifications and limitations that > apply to > > > languages, math and logic must be very similar to those for building > models > > > for all systems of belief (ideologies, religions and science). > Deductive > > > reasoning and inductive reasoning are the tools used to examine the > > > consequences of the axiomatics. How axiomatics and reason might fail > to > > > lead us to ‘truth' and certainty about models therefore also requires > > > understanding of inherent limitations imposed on both deductive and > > > inductive reasoning. > > > > > Sciences differ from ideologies, from most mathematics and from > > > religions. The latter require undiluted, absolute faith/belief in the > > > ‘truth’ of their axiomatics. However, science accepts (also > axiomatically) > > > that the degree-of-belief/confidence-in its models can never be > absolute. > > > The degree-of-belief is measured by how strongly pertinent, empirical > > > evidence – developed through repeated observation and ‘testing’, and > always > > > limited by uncertainties of inductive reasoning, confirm the > > > predictions/projections of the models. > > > > > Such degrees-of-belief are analogue (expressed quantitatively, as > > > ‘different shades of grey’) rather than digital [expressed as black > and > > > white (false or true)]. Scientific models of observable phenomena > (objects > > > and processes), provide simpler and more reliable explanations than > those > > > of non-scientific disciplines and ideologies. Ockham’s Razor – the > dictum > > > to choose the simplest explanation, all other things being equal – > > > therefore generally recommends placing scientific models ahead of > ideologic > > > models of observable phenomena. > > > > > These differences are sources of science’s great potential to > self-correct > > > – and with ever increasing confidence – to incrementally (though often > > > sporadically) improve quality of life. > > > > > In teaching, and in the general valuation of science, these topics, > and > > > their contributions to improving the quality of life, are increasingly > > > neglected. They are explored to better clarify how > > > science fits into the wide spectrum of beliefs – (and perhaps help > reverse > > > this disturbing trend ;-) > > > > >http://www.pipeline.com/~lenornst/ScienceInTheSpectrumOfBelief.pdf > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. 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