Hi Bruno,

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed)  
> universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even  
> maximally conscious.
> 
What could "maximally conscious" mean? My intuition says quite strongly that
consciousness is a dynamic open-ended process and that there is no such
thing as maximally conscious (exept maybe in the trivial sense of "simply
conscious at all"). I can't even conceive what this could be like.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and  
> this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of  
> some sort).
Why do you think it could be a delusion? This would be a bit reminscent of
buddhism. For me it sounds like quite a terrible thought. After all it would
mean all progress is in a way illusory and maybe not even desirable, whereas
I really wish (and pragmatically believe) that eternal progress is the thing
that can fullfill our ideals of truth, conscious insight and happiness.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ 
> ingenuity. The first is needed to develop the later, but the later has  
> a negative feedback on the first.
Can you explain this?

It seems to me that there is no clear line between intelligence and
competence and that some kind of competences (like aligning yourself with
the beliefs of society) can limit intelligence, but some help to develop
more intelligence (like doing science).
-- 
View this message in context: 
http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p31854353.html
Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to