Hi Colin,
On 07 Jun 2011, at 09:42, Colin Hales wrote:
Hi,
Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',
International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1,
2011. 1-35.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613
The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!
Congratulation Colin.
Like others, I don't succeed in getting it, neither at home nor at
the
university.
From the abstract I am afraid you might not have taken into account
our
(many) conversations. Most of what you say about the impossibility of
building an artificial scientist is provably correct in the (weak)
comp
theory. It is unfortunate that you derive this from comp
+materialism, which
is inconsistent. Actually, comp prevents "artificial intelligence".
This
does not prevent the existence, and even the apparition, of
intelligent
machines. But this might happen *despite* humans, instead of
'thanks to the
humans'. This is related with the fact that we cannot know which
machine we
are ourselves. Yet, we can make copy at some level (in which case
we don't
know what we are really creating or recreating, and then, also,
descendent
of bugs in regular programs can evolve. Or we can get them
serendipitously.
It is also relate to the fact that we don't *want* intelligent
machine,
which is really a computer who will choose its user, if ... he want
one. We
prefer them to be slaves. It will take time before we recognize them
(apparently).
Of course the 'naturalist comp' theory is inconsistent. Not sure
you take
that into account too.
Artificial intelligence will always be more mike fishing or exploring
spaces, and we might *discover* strange creatures. Arithmetical
truth is a
universal zoo. Well, no, it is really a jungle. We don't know what
is in
there. We can only scratch a tiny bit of it.
Now, let us distinguish two things, which are very different:
1) intelligence-consciousness-free-will-emotion
and
2) cleverness-competence-ingenuity-gifted-learning-ability
"1)" is necessary for the developpment of "2)", but "2)" has a
negative
feedback on "1)".
I have already given on this list what I call the smallest theory of
intelligence.
By definition a machine is intelligent if it is not stupid. And a
machine
can be stupid for two reason:
she believes that she is intelligent, or
she believes that she is stupid.
Of course, this is arithmetized immediately in a weakening of G,
the theory
C having as axioms the modal normal axioms and rules + Dp -> ~BDp.
So Dt
(arithmetical consistency) can play the role of intelligence, and Bf
(inconsistance) plays the role of stupidity. G* and G proves BDt ->
Bf and
G* proves BBf -> Bf (but not G!).
This illustrates that "1)" above might come from Löbianity, and
"2)" above
(the scientist) is governed by theoretical artificial intelligence
(Case and
Smith, Oherson, Stob, Weinstein). Here the results are not just
NON-constructive, but are *necessarily* so. Cleverness is just
something
that we cannot program. But we can prove, non constructively, the
existence
of powerful learning machine. We just cannot recognize them, or
build them.
It is like with the algorithmically random strings, we cannot
generate them
by a short algorithm, but we can generate all of them by a very short
algorithm.
So, concerning intelligence/consciousness (as opposed to
cleverness), I
think we have passed the "singularity". Nothing is more
intelligent/conscious than a virgin universal machine. By
programming it, we
can only make his "soul" fell, and, in the worst case, we might get
something as stupid as human, capable of feeling itself superior, for
example.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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