On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote:
[SPK]
The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the
existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a
theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly
proving that the physical world does not exist.
How many times do we have to tell you that's not true?
Hi Joseph,
Please be specific. What is "not true" about the sentence I wrote
above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read:
" 8) Yes, but what if we don't grant a concrete robust physical
universe? Up to this
stage, w_e can still escape the conclusion of the seven
preceding reasoning steps, by
postulating that a ''physical universe'' really ''exists'' and is too
little in the sense of not being
able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it,
so that our usual physical
predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated
''little'' computational
histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and
disgraceful. _It can also be
quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of
Ockham's Razor, and
obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to
accept comp+ (in which
case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology,
and the general shape of
physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically,
there is still a place for both
physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th
present step will explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose._This will make the
notion of concrete and
existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power._ _It
will follow that a much
weaker and usual form of Ockham's razor can be used to conclude that not
only physics has
been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that
''matter'' has been
ontologically reduced to ''mind'' where mind is defined as the
object study of fundamental
machine psychology. _All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is
that comp forbids to
associate inner experiences with the physical processing related
to the computations
corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical
''supervenience thesis'' of the
materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner
experiences can only be
associated with type of computation.
Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine
state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time
(x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which
is accepted as existing
independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)."
If this is not a statement that "the physical world does not exist"
and, instead, that all that exists is "abstract machine", I will eat my
hat.
I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al
allows for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties
but I have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the
elimination of the properties of the physical world demands the
elimination of the "existence" of the physical world. My claim is that
we can recover appearances by decoupling existence from property
definiteness, but that idea is either not being understood or is being
rejected out of hand.
Onward!
Stephen
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