On Sunday, May 13, 2012 6:17:12 PM UTC+10, RAM wrote: > > > > On Sun, May 13, 2012 at 6:44 AM, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> I can see that. But consider that the notion of being able to change the >> outcome of future society - 'prevent' or 'deter' anything at all - depends >> on the possibility of variant futures. From the absolute perspective, such >> variation is impossible (or is merely random and so not subject to reason >> or 'choice'). So how does one justify any decision? Seen absolutely, it was >> inevitable and there can be no talk of a good or a bad decision. >> > > I think determinism should not be confused with fatalism (i.e. it does not > matter what you do, things will turn out the same). In determinism it > matters what you do, even if what you do is determined. Once an outcome is > obtained, we can still analyze the contribution of decisions to that > outcome, evaluate them, and most importantly, learn from them. Next time, > what we have learned will be taken into account for the next decision. This > can take place in a purely deterministic world. Even two deterministic > (with some pseudorandomness added) computer chess players playing against > each other, can learn from each other mistakes and use what they have > learned for future competitions. >
Obviously, I agree with you. Because the decision-maker is part of the deterministic process, the determinism of the system as a whole is irrelevant from his/her point of view. I am saying that given that any decision-maker is embedded in a relative local system in this way, the idea of free will makes local sense - ie, there are good and bad decisions, easy and difficult decisions, and the idea of morality remain coherent, despite the determinism that is apparent from a God's eye view. I did not say "it does not matter what you do, things will turn out the same". Quite the reverse. > The point is not changing future outcomes. In fact we don't know what that > outcome will be. The point is obtaining good outcomes. > > > Ricardo. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/8Qg4plyS9pgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
