On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.

Yes.
Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p?

This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.

With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).

So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like "1+1=2" remains true in absence of any thinker.




It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X -> X' changes, all while preserving the Bp&p term, p would be a variable of or in X, X', ... .

A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence. We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).

Bruno



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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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